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Abstract: We propose a novel approach to the analysis of organizations by developing a
computerized platform that reproduces relevant features of existing organizations such
as real-effort tasks and real-leisure alternative activities (Internet). In this environment,
we find strong incentives effects as organizations using individual incentives
significantly outperform those relying on team incentives. Combining real-time peer
monitoring with team incentives, we report striking evidence of positive peer effects as
production increases by 50% and Internet usage decreases by 54% compared with
organizations using team incentives alone. Peer monitoring allows virtual organizations
using team incentives to perform as well as those using individual incentives. However,
the positive effect of peer monitoring does not apply to low performers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Bringing the organization into the laboratory
In this paper, we propose an innovative tool for the empirical study of organizations that may
serve as a common tool for multiple disciplines ranging from Sociology to Organizational
Economics. Such disciplines have generally used different empirical methods including field and
case studies as well as laboratory experiments. To that end, we build on previous research in
Experimental Economics and develop a computerized organizational environment that allows for
both tight experimenter control and a high level of realism. We believe this is a crucial step in
order to overcome the usual critique toward laboratory experiments stated explicitly in Falk and
Heckman (2009, p. 1): “There is also a widespread view that the lab produces unrealistic data,
which lacks relevance for understanding the “real world”.” The wide acceptance of the
experimental methodology as an acceptable alternative to the analysis of field data may result
from the design of laboratory environments that closely reproduce important features of field
settings. Recent studies have stressed sharp differences between field and laboratory behaviors in
the case of professional bidders (Harrison and List (2008)) or in the case of professional sports
players and college students (Levitt, List and Riley (2010)). These studies emphasize that the
rejection of standard minmax game theory predictions in the laboratory, despite its prevalence in
the field, may be explained by the gap between field environments and their abstract
representation in the laboratory.
The challenge is to develop laboratory settings that are sufficiently close to field environments
while maintaining the ability to control the different features of the decision environment
(Charness and Kuhn (2011), Falk and Fehr (2003), Falk and Heckman (2009)). The need for
control is critical because the analysis of fundamental aspects of organizations such as incentives
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schemes (Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review), hierarchies (Qian (1994), Radner (1992),
Williamson (1967)), monitoring (Alchian and Demsetz (1972)) or delegation of authority
(Aghion and Tirole (1997), Van den Steen (2009)) are likely to be affected by confounding
factors like peer pressure effects, corporate culture, implicit contracts and influence costs. This
need for control may account for the increasing popularity of laboratory experiments in the field
of Labor Economics (Charness and Kuhn (2011)). The experimental approach has permitted a
direct test of microeconomic models (Falk and Heckman (2009)) and has allowed researchers to
identify a series of practically relevant behavioral mechanisms such as equity concerns and
reciprocal motives.2 Nevertheless, laboratory experiments inherently lack external validity due to
their simplification of the work environment (Charness and Kuhn (2011)). For example, in a
standard principal-agent experiment, the agent’s level of effort would be assimilated to a
monetary cost. The use of abstract effort has been complemented by a large number of studies
that have incorporated real-effort tasks such as solving mazes (Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini
(2003)), puzzles (Rutström and Williams (2000)), anagrams (Charness and Villeval (2009)),
optimization problems (Dickinson and Villeval (2008), Montmarquette et al. (2004), van Dijk,
Sonnemans and van Winden (2001)) or mailing tasks (Carpenter, Matthews and Schirm (2010),
Falk and Ichino (2006)).3 Other works have attempted to raise the external validity of laboratory
experiments by considering different subject pools such as soldiers (Fehr et al. (1998))
manufacturing workers (Barr and Serneels (2009)) or retirees (Charness and Villeval (2009)).
These works show that the prevalence of social preferences and reciprocal behaviors is not
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These features have been introduced in the theory of incentives (Dur and Glazer (2008), Englmaier and
Wambach (2010), Kandel and Lazear (1992), Rotemberg (1994)).
3
Van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden (2001) stress that real effort and abstract effort are not equivalent as
individuals may derive utility from certain tasks. For example, people may be willing to give their time to charities
while not willing to donate money to the same organizations.
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confined to student participants.4 Another strategy that aims at increasing external validity
consists in the development of natural and field experiments in the workplace (Bandiera,
Barankay and Rasul (2005), Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007), Fehr and Goette (2007),
Knez and Simester (2001), Lazear (2000), Shearer (2004)). As is emphasized in Charness and
Kuhn (2011) there is no clear evidence that the prevalence of social preferences documented in
laboratory settings is also observed in the field. For example, Gneezy and List (2006) and
Fershtman, Gneezy, and List (2009) put forward the limited importance of reciprocal behaviors
and social preferences in the field. Nevertheless, Bellemare and Shearer (2009) report that a onetime monetary gift increased tree-planters’ productivity on the day of the gift.
In this paper, we propose an alternative tool for the empirical analysis of organizational issues
that aims at combining the strengths of field studies with those of laboratory experiments. To that
end, we design a computerized platform that reproduces relevant features of real-world
organizations while ensuring tight experimenter control over the different elements of the
environment.5 We introduce a framework with a real-effort organizational task, real-leisure
activities as well as a real-time supervision technology. At the same time we maintain tight
control over the organizational features studied by the experimenter in line with standard
laboratory experiments. We consider two applications of our computerized platform that are
related to the method of incentives and to the method of persuasion as defined by Barnard (1938)
in the following quotation.
An organization can secure the efforts necessary to its existence, then, either by the
objective inducements it provides or by changing states of mind. . . . We shall call the
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Nevertheless, notable differences exist between subject pools as is found in Charness and Villeval (2009) when
comparing cooperative behaviors of seniors and juniors in a team production game.
5
We refer to our organizations as being virtual in line with the following definition: “being on or simulated on a
computer or computer network” (Merriam-Webster dictionary).
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process of offering objective incentives “the method of incentives”; and the processes of
changing subjective attitudes “the method of persuasion.”
—Barnard (1938, p. 142)
We will compare individual and team incentives as an application of “the method of
incentives” while considering the analysis of peer effects as an application derived from “the
method of persuasion”.

1.2. Team Incentives in the Theory of Organizations
As a point of departure for the analysis of organizations and the development of an economic
theory of the firm, theorists have studied issues of asymmetric information in the context of
teams (Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Holmström (1982)). In particular, these authors put forward
the pervasiveness of free-riding behaviors in teams in which it is difficult to observe and verify
the contribution of each partner. Indeed, workers paid according to an aggregate measure of
performance such as team output are likely to exert less effort than if they were paid according to
their individual performance. A central feature of successful organizations consists of
overcoming free riding by designing effective monitoring schemes (Alchian and Demsetz
(1972)) or using budget-breaking devices aimed at threatening potential free riders (Holmström
(1982)).6,7
At the empirical level, the evidence of free riding behavior in teams has been limited
(Encinosa, Gaynor and Rebitzer (2007), Gaynor and Pauly (1990), Leibowitz and Tollison
(1980), Newhouse (1973)). Instead, team incentives have been found to be particularly effective
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Che and Yoo (2001) have also shown that free riding in teams can be eliminated when considering long-term
horizons.
7
Notice that an important element in the development of the incentives-based theory of the firm is the multi-tasking
problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994)). In the present study, we set aside multi-tasking issues.
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as is reported in laboratory experiments (Dohmen and Falk (2011), van Dijk, Sonnemans and van
Winden (2001)) as well as in field studies (Dumaine (1990, 1994), Hamilton, Nickerson and
Owan (2003), Hansen (1997), Ichniowski et al. (1996), Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997),
Kruse (1992), Manz and Sims (1993)).8 For example, Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003)
show that equal sharing of production bonuses within teams seems to stimulate cooperation,
information sharing, monitoring and even mutual training, generating a productivity increase
(relative to piece rates) despite the expected free-rider problem. The empirical difficulty to
identify free-riding behaviors in teams is likely due to the lack of control over crucial aspects of
work teams that act as confounding factors such as peer monitoring, interpersonal relations or
communication. For example, in the context of public good games, peer punishments (Fehr and
Gächter (2000), Masclet et al. (2003), Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007)) as well as
communication (Bochet, Page and Putterman (2006), Isaac and Walker (1988), Sally (1995))
have been recognized as effective mechanisms to increase contributions.
The comparison of individual and team incentives constitutes a necessary starting point to
assess the importance of incentives setting in organizations. Indeed, not identifying any
differences in performance between organizations using individual incentives and those using
team incentives would represent an important challenge for the theory of incentives. In this study
and in line with previous laboratory experiments, we are able to compare team and individual
incentives while controlling for team-specific features that may interfere in the empirical
assessment of team incentives. A crucial difference between our experimental environment and
standard experimental works is the introduction of long and real-effort work tasks as well as realtime access to leisure activities (Internet). The introduction of real-leisure alternative activities

8

Empirical evidence on the positive effect of incentives schemes on performance (Booth and Frank (1999), Lazear
(2000), and Prendergast (1999)) do not analyze individual and team incentives independently.
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appears to be pertinent as we find that subjects are indeed willing to undertake on-the-job leisure
activities for which they are not paid by the experimenter. In particular, subjects spent 15.4% of
their time browsing the Internet when they were paid according to individual incentives.
Additionally, the proportion of time subjects dedicated to browsing the Internet increased from
9.6% in the first period to 19% in the last two periods. This first observation shows that our
environment is likely to be appropriate to identify shirking behaviors in organizations using team
incentives.
We confirm this conjecture by comparing organizations using team incentives and those using
individual incentives. Production levels were on average 52% higher and Internet usage was 46%
lower under individual incentives than under team incentives. This result was driven by
extensive shirking behaviors in the team incentives treatment in which subjects spent on average
28.5% of their time browsing the Internet. This percentage reached 35% in the last hour of the
experiment.
This first result is crucial as it shows that increasing the level of realism in the experimental
environment leads to results that are consistent with incentives theory (see Holmström (1979),
and Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review). Our findings are in line with the sound premise
that performance is increased by the use of high-powered incentives schemes.
The introduction of Internet as an alternative leisure activity as well as the introduction of a
clicking task that gives rewards to subjects just for the sake of being at their workstation are
crucial elements of our environments that participate in making shirking as salient as working.
Indeed, subjects spent a considerable amount of their time browsing the Internet and a significant
proportion of them did not produce anything (21.7% under team incentives and 12.1% under
individual incentives).

7

As a second step of our analysis, we introduced a real-time monitoring technology in our
virtual organizations so as to analyze whether the poor performance of team incentives could be
mitigated by peer pressure.

1.3. Supervision and Peer-monitoring in the Theory of Organizations
Supervision is an important aspect of the theory of the firm that was mentioned by preeminent
scholars as one of the raison d'être of organizations (Barzel (1982), Chandler (1992), Jensen and
Meckling (1976)). Alchian and Demsetz (1972) put forward the need for centralized supervision
in a context of asymmetric information between managers and their subordinates in a team
context. The authors argue that supervision should be performed by a residual claimant so as to
provide the monitor with adequate incentives to supervise. By gathering information about the
agents, the monitor will be able to pay employees according to their individual contribution.
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) put forward that peer monitoring is not an efficient mechanism
because the agents would tend to shy away from monitoring activities. However, other theories
view peer monitoring as a highly-effective mechanism (Carpenter, Bowles and Gintis (2009),
Kandel and Lazear (1992)). Kandel and Lazear stress the role of shame arising when workers
produce less than the group average as an important mechanism in understanding the
effectiveness of peer pressure. Carpenter, Bowles and Gintis (2009) emphasize the role of
negative reciprocity as a behavioral mechanism leading contributors to voluntary incur private
costs to punish free riders. Evidence of such behaviors has been found in public good
experiments (Fehr and Gächter (2000), Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007)). Grosse, Putterman
and Rockenbach (2008) stress the popularity of peer monitoring devices in a modified version of
the public good game. In their experiment, subjects completed a public good game and then
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decided how much to invest in a monitoring technology which precision determined the
allocation of team profits. The authors found that subjects mostly relied on peer monitoring as a
disciplining device. However, specialist monitoring emerged when the monetary cost of
monitoring by team members was greater than the cost associated with specialist monitoring.
Positive peer effects have been reported in a series of recent field experiments. Falk and
Ichino (2006) found that students who worked for fixed wages to stuff envelopes performed
significantly better when working in pairs than when working alone. Mas and Moretti (2009)
studied the case of supermarket cashiers and found positive peer effects on the number of items
scanned by cashiers. The authors considered workers’ visual contact and frequency of
interactions as measures of peer pressure. In a related field work, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul
(2005) found that mutual monitoring led fruit pickers to reduce their productivity when they
were paid according to relative performance. The authors interpret this result as evidence of
workers partially internalizing the negative externality of their production on the pay of their coworkers.
In the field studies described previously, not only did experimenters not have access to precise
measures of peer pressure, they also did not have control over the monitoring process. Peer
pressure was assessed by a variety of observable measures such as visual contact, physical
proximity or frequency of interactions. In this paper, we bring real-time supervision in a
controlled laboratory environment so as to enable the experimenter to measure peer pressure
with precision. In particular, we are able to record the amount of time subjects spent watching
others as well as discern the identity of the subjects who were watching others.
Our peer monitoring technology is characterized by the fact that each team member could
monitor their peers’ activities at any point in time during the experiment. As a result, subjects
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could shape their monitoring strategy by deciding upon which subjects to monitor and when to
do so.9 Monitors were informed in real-time about the activities undertaken by supervisees and
could therefore identify whether they were browsing the Internet or producing for the
organization. It is important to note that subjects were notified on their screen whenever they
were being watched by others. This feature induced social pressure that is considered to be an
important aspect of peer monitoring (Mas and Moretti (2009)). In that respect, our monitoring
technology was more intrusive than the mere release of feedback about relative performance
introduced in recent experimental works (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011), Eriksson, Poulsen
and Villeval (2009), Kuhnen and Tymula (2009)).10 These studies on feedback are related to
early works in the Psychology literature starting with the development of the social comparison
theory (Festinger (1954)).11 Festinger proposes that individuals try to assess their performance
with respect to others’ when they lack an objective means for evaluation. Upward comparison,
learning that others perform better than one, generally raises motivation as well as effort and
performance (Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons and Kuyper (1999), Seta (1982), Smither, London and
Reilly (2005), Wood (1989)). However, the evidence regarding the effect of feedback on
performance is mixed (Alvero, Bucklin and Austin (2001), Balcazar, Hopkins and Suarez (1985),
Kluger and DeNisi (1996)).12
Our controlled environment offers a single opportunity to provide a detailed analysis of peer
monitoring activities. We first report that a large proportion of subjects (88.3%) decided to
9

This endogenous aspect of our monitoring technology can be linked to search experiments in which subjects decide
whether to observe or not their relative performance (Burks et al. (2010), Falk, Huffman and Sunde (2006)).
10
Using both piece-rate and tournament incentive schemes, Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009) do not report
significant effect of feedback on individual performance. Nevertheless, other studies show that social comparison
may lead people to exert more effort in tournaments (Kuhnen and Tymula (2009)) or in the context of individual
incentives (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011)). The positive effect of feedback in tournaments has been modeled by
Kräkel (2008).
11
Extensions of the social comparison theory have been developed (see Suls, Martin and Wheeler (2002) for a
review).
12
A significant number of studies find null or even negative effects on performance.
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monitor others. However, subjects dedicated only a small proportion of their time (4.4%) to
monitoring, compared with the proportion of their time subjects spent working (82.5%) or
browsing the Internet (13.1%). Yet, all subjects were being watched for at least 12 minutes
during the experiment and for an average of 22.4% of their time. Team members seemed to share
the monitoring burden as only 11.7% of them did not supervise their peers at any time. In
addition, subjects spent the same amount of time monitoring others regardless of their
performance on the work task.
We find evidence of strong peer pressure effects when comparing organizations endowed
with peer monitoring and team incentives with organizations relying on team incentives alone.
Production was 50% higher and Internet usage was 54% lower under peer monitoring. In
contrast to public good games with monetary punishments (Carpenter (2007a, 2007b), Fehr and
Gächter (2000)), both effort and efficiency were increased by the introduction of peer
monitoring.13 This was the case because subjects spent little time watching others while sharing
the monitoring burden so as to limit the cost of monitoring.
Peer monitoring combined with team incentives led to levels of performance and Internet
usage that were remarkably similar to individual incentives, despite the absence in our design of
punishments devices, communication technologies or physical proximity among subjects.
Nevertheless, peer pressure was ineffective in raising the production of low performers although
they spent more time working on the task and less time browsing the Internet than in the team
incentives treatment. We relate this result to Zajonc’s social facilitation theory (1965, 1980)
according to which low performers are likely to become more active but less accurate when
being monitored.

13

In public good games, despite the cost of punishments incurred by participants, efficiency may be achieved in the
long run (Gächter, Renner and Sefton (2008)).
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This paper is organized as follows. The experimental design is detailed in the next section
while results are presented in Section III. Concluding remarks are presented in Section IV.

2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
2.1. Virtual Organization With Real Effort and Real Leisure
The core of our methodology is the design of a computerized platform that reproduces crucial
features of real-world work environments. We develop a framework in which subjects can
undertake a real-effort organizational task while having access to Internet at any point in time
during the experiment.14

2.1.1. The Work Task
We introduce a particularly long and laborious task so as to reduce as much as possible the
role of intrinsic motivation in our environment. Indeed, subjects may like certain tasks and derive
direct utility from undertaking the activity. By using a long, repetitive and effortful task we
ensure that individual performance is mostly driven by effort considerations. We do so because
our main objective is to test standard predictions of incentives theory while abstracting from
confounding factors such as intrinsic motivation. The duration of our task as well as its intricacy
were considerably higher than in previous real-effort experiments that have reported the use of
counting tasks (Dohmen and Falk (2011), Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009), Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007)).15 Subjects were asked to sum up matrices of 36 numbers for 1 hour and 40
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A video presentation of the software is available at http://sites.google.com/site/virtualorganization/videos.
Different variations of this task have been used by Bartling, Fehr, Maréchal and Schunk (2009) and Dohmen and
Falk (2010). A counting task that consisted of summing up the number of zeros in a table randomly filled with ones
and zeros was also used in Falk and Huffman (2007). A long typing task was used by Dickinson’s (1999)
experiment in which subjects had to come during four days for two-hour experiments. Falk and Ichino (2006) used a
four-hour mailing task in their field experiment on peer effects.
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minutes while Niederle and Vesterlund used a 5-minute task and Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval
used a 20-minute task. The duration of our task was also ten times longer than the multiplication
task used in Dohmen and Falk (2011). As a result, we expected to identify signs of fatigue and
boredom during the experiment.
In the work task, participants were not allowed to use a pen, scratch paper or calculator. This
rule amplified the level of effort subjects had to exert in order to complete tables correctly. Each
table had 6 rows and 6 columns. The numbers in each table were generated randomly. In each
period, the first 5 tables were filled with numbers between 0 and 5 while the following 3 tables
were filled with numbers between 5 and 9. The remaining tables were filled with one-decimal
numbers between 0.0 and 1.0. The increase in the difficulty of the tables was again motivated by
the willingness to design a particularly laborious work task.16 An example is shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1.—Example of table summation for the work task.
Before providing the final sum of all numbers in the table in the yellow cell, participants had
to fill in the 12 blue cells that could be used to sum each row and each column separately. Filling
in these cells did not directly generate earnings but could help subjects compute the final sum.
Only the final answer was rewarded although intermediate sums of all rows and columns were
required but did not generate payoffs. Each table completed correctly generated a 40-cent profit
while a penalty of 20 cents was subtracted from individual production for each incorrect
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We believe that, given the limited duration of laboratory experiments, the use of long and laborious tasks are
necessary to create boredom and fatigue.
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answer.17 After each subject completed a table, the accumulated individual production was
updated so that subjects knew whether their answer was correct or not. At the end of each period,
and only then, the total amount of money generated by all 10 participants’ work task during the
period was displayed in the history panel located at the bottom of the subjects’ screen.
At any point during the experiment, participants could switch from the work task to the leisure
activity that consisted of browsing the Internet. Each activity was undertaken separately, in a
different screen. To switch from one activity to another subjects simply had to click on the
corresponding option of the action menu displayed on their screen (see Figure 2).

2.1.2. Internet Browsing
Participants were informed that their usage of the Internet was strictly confidential and could
not be recorded. Subjects were free to consult their email or visit any web page.18 Internet
browsing and the work task were undertaken on different screens so that subjects could not
complete tables while being on the Internet. Switching back and forth between the Internet
browser and the work task was quick and easy. Subjects who returned to the Internet screen after
working on the task were automatically directed to the last web page they visited.19 The Internet
browser was embedded in the software (see Figure 2) so that the experimenter could keep record
of the switching times between activities as well as the exact amount of time subjects spent on
each activity.20

17

Penalties did not apply when individual production was equal to zero so that individual production could not be
negative.
18
Subjects were expected to follow the norms set by the university regarding the use of Internet in the campus.
19
For example, a subject could decide to go to the work task while writing an email and return to the Internet
browser to finish and send the email.
20
JxBrowser Version 2.3, TeamDev Ltd.
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FIGURE 2.—Embedded Internet screen.
The introduction of Internet in our virtual organizations is motivated by the widespread use of
Internet at the workplace. According to a 2005 study by American Online and Salary.com,
employees spend about 26% of their time on activities unrelated to their work (Malachowski
(2005)).21 Almost half of this time actually corresponds to Internet usage.22 In addition, a study
by Nielsen/Net Ratings report that people spend more than twice as much time online at the
office as they do at home (Farrell (2000)). Gordon (2000) argues that Internet usage in the
workplace may damage employees’ productivity (see also Young (2005, 2006)).
An appealing feature of Internet as an alternative to the work task is the wide range of
activities that can be completed online. Indeed, a large number of people are likely to derive
utility from Internet access as they will be able to browse Web pages that best correspond to their
favorite hobbies. In addition, the use of Internet is widespread regardless of gender, age or
income.23 According to Jones (2002) and Jones et al. (2009) the use of Internet among university

21

“Wasted Time At Work Costing Companies Billions”, San Francisco Chronicle, July 11, 2005, discussing the
findings
of
the
AOL/Salary.com
study:
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2005/07/11/wastingtime.TMP
22
Similar estimates are provided by a 2005 study by Web@Work.
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/BUSINESS/05/19/web.work/index.html
23
See the 2007 survey by Pew Internet & American Life Project and eMarketer:
http://www.ignitesocialmedia.com/social-media-stats/internet-usage-by-age-gender-race
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students has increased significantly in the last years. Jones et al. (2009) found that 94% of
college students spend at least one hour on the Internet every day, and 53% spend three or more
hours.24 Furthermore, Internet is not restricted to a specific kind of leisure as opposed to simply
playing a video game, reading a newspaper or listening to music. All of these activities and more
are available through the Internet. Looking at the most visited Web sites by college students
gives us an idea of the great variety of options available on the Internet.25 In addition, Jones et al.
(2009) find that students access the Internet several times during the day and at nonspecific
times.
Furthermore, devising environments that include features of real-world organizations such as
on-the-job Internet usage may reduce demand effects in the laboratory (Zizzo (2010)).26 Indeed,
the use of Internet as an alternative activity as well may lead people to consider that shirking is
an equally salient alternative to working.
The consideration of leisure-related issues in the experimental literature was introduced in the
analysis of labor supply by Dickinson (1999). The objective of the author was to assess both
income and substitution effects using laboratory experiments. Participants had to undertake a
two-hour typing task on three different days. In one of the two treatments (the combined
experiment), subjects could leave the laboratory whenever they had achieved a certain output
level. This aimed at capturing off-the-job leisure activities. Falk and Huffman (2007) also

24

Harris Interactive’s “360 College Explorer Outlook Study” in 2002 found that Internet is the most common
activity among students, with 98% of students going online at least a few times a week, and spending on average
almost 10 hours per week on the Net (http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=441).
25
The ten most visited Web sites are Facebook, ESPN, Google, CNN, YouTube, MSN, Hulu, StumbleUpon,
Pandora and Craiglist for male students and Facebook, Google, Yahoo!, PerezHilton.com, MySpace, School’s site,
CNN, AOL, eBay and The Superficial for college girls (Youth Trends, “The Top Ten List Report: College Q3
2008,” http://ldsmediatalk.com/2009/02/16/internet-use-among-teens-vs-college-students/).
26
In addition, subjects faced computerized instructions and were not interacting with the experimenter except for the
unlikely case in which questions were raised by subjects. The great majority of subjects (we estimate this proportion
to be around 95%) would typically never ask questions. We think this is partly explained by the intuitive structure of
our environment.
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introduced the possibility for subjects to quit the experiment when analyzing minimum wages
and workfare in the laboratory. However, it is difficult to interpret the heterogeneity in quitting
behaviors given the lack of control over subjects’ activities outside the laboratory. Ours is the
first experimental design that embeds on-the-job leisure activities into the work environment and
that allows the experimenter to measure the exact amount of time each subject spent on leisure
and work activities.27

2.1.3. The Clicking Task
In addition to the previously mentioned activities, each subject could click on a yellow box
moving from left to right at the bottom of their screen. This task was referred to as Task 1. Each
time a subject clicked on the yellow box he or she earned 5 cents. Subjects’ earnings obtained
from clicking the box were displayed on the screen and updated each time they clicked on the
yellow box. The box appeared at the bottom of a subject’s screen every 25 seconds whether a
subject was on the work task or browsing the Internet. The yellow box always appeared first on
the left hand side of the screen, and moved to the right (see Figure 3). It remained during 4
seconds in the first cell on the left and then moved to the next cell for another 4 seconds if the
subject had not clicked on the box. This means that the box was visible on the screen for a total
of 20 seconds or until a subject clicked on it. Given that the experiment consisted of 5 periods of
20 minutes each, subjects could earn a total of $12.00 just by clicking on all the 240 yellow
boxes that appeared on the screen during the experiment.

27

Two related studies (Charness, Masclet and Villeval (2010), Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009)) have also
introduced on-the-job leisure activities in experimental environments by giving subjects access to magazines.
However, the leisure activity was not embedded in the computerized platform.
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FIGURE 3.—The clicking task.
This task aimed at representing the pay that workers may obtain just for being at their
workstation. One can see this activity as a way to endogenize the show-up fee.28 A crucial
motivation for the introduction of the clicking task was to add realism to our experimental design
by allowing subjects to collect a constant flow of earnings without being actually working. In
each period, subjects could earn up to $2.40 by clicking on the yellow boxes.

2.2. Virtual Organization: Real-time Monitoring
Another crucial feature of our experimental environement is the introduction of real-time
supervision. In the peer monitoring treatment, subjects were able monitor others’ activities in
real time. Our objective was to design an environment that allows for the emergence of peer
effects that were defined by Charness and Kuhn (2011) as follows: “…pure peer effects refer to a
situation where workers work, side by side, for the same firm but do not interact in any way
(except that they observe each others’ work activity).”
To that end, we allowed subjects to monitor others’ activities at any time during the
experiment by selecting the Watch option in their action menu. In that respect, our monitoring
technology offered a unique opportunity to assess the effect of peer pressure over time and
examine the conjecture that peer effects are likely to fade away as time passes (Falk and Ichino
(2006)).

28

Notice that subjects were also paid the standard laboratory show-up fee of $7.
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Monitoring activities had to be undertaken in a separate screen so that subjects could not
complete the work task or the leisure activity while monitoring others.29 As a result, monitoring
imposed an opportunity cost on watchers that was different in nature from the monetary cost of
punishments in public good games (Fehr and Gächter (2000)). In the monitoring screen, subjects
could decide whether to monitor only a subset or all the other subjects at the same time. The
information was displayed in a table, where each column showed information regarding the
activities completed by a given subject (see Figure 4).

FIGURE 4.—Monitoring screen with a zoom on subject B13.
The header of each column indicated the subject’s experiment ID. Each cell of a given
column displayed information in real time about the activities undertaken by the selected subject.
These activities were labeled as follows: Watch (monitoring others subjects’ activities), Internet
(browsing the web) or Task 2 (undertaking the work task). Monitors were also informed
whenever a subject entered a number in the blue cells of a table in order to sum a column or a
row before providing a final answer for the work task. This was described as Sum Column in the
monitoring table. Finally, the current production of monitored subjects as well as their
contribution to the work task (in % terms) were shown in the monitoring screen. For example, in
Figure 4, subject B13 was monitored while entering the sum of the rows and columns in the work
task (Sum Column) before providing a final answer (Answer Task 2). The answer provided was
correct since B13’s production increased to 40.00¢. At the same time, the contribution of subject
29

Subjects could still click on the yellow box while monitoring others.
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B13 to the work task increased from nothing to one-third. Notice that after completing the table
correctly, subject B13 switched to the Internet screen with 13 minutes and 21 seconds remaining
in the period.
Subjects were notified with a message stating the experiment ID of the watcher jointly with an
eye picture whenever they were being watched. The message and the icon were displayed at the
bottom of the subjects’ screens as in Figure 5. This feature induced social pressure that is
considered as an important aspect of peer monitoring (Mas and Moretti (2009)). In that respect,
our monitoring technology was more intrusive than, for example, the release of feedback about
relative performance (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011), Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009),
Kuhnen and Tymula (2009)).

FIGURE 5.—Notification when a subject is being watched.
There is experimental evidence that subconscious cues of being watched by others may
increase subjects’ cooperative behavior (see Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006), Burnham and
Hare (2007), Haley and Fessler (2005)). In our experiment, participants knew that they were
being watched by a subject present in the laboratory whose experiment ID was displayed on the
left of the eye picture (see Figure 5).
The monitoring technology introduced in the present paper allows for precise control over the
supervision activities. In contrast with field studies (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005), Falk
and Ichino (2006), Mas and Moretti (2009)), we are able collect precise measures of peer
pressure. For example, we can measure the exact amount of time subjects were being watched by
others as well as the amount of time they spent watching others. It is also possible to identify the
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watchers as well as the subjects who were being watched. Finally, the experimenter has access to
the information that was displayed on the watchers’ screens at a given time. This information can
be used in the analysis of peer monitoring effects.
Another distinctive feature of our monitoring technology is that subjects could freely decide
upon their monitoring strategy. Subjects could choose who to monitor and when to do so. This
feature of the supervision technology will allow us to analyze subjects’ monitoring strategies.

2.3. Treatments & Hypotheses
We ran three different treatments (see Table 1). In the baseline treatment, subjects were
rewarded on the work task according to their individual production. We refer to this case as
Treatment I for individual incentives. In the second treatment, team incentives (Treatment T), the
total production of the 10 subjects participating in the experiment was equally distributed among
them. Our third experiment was the peer monitoring treatment (Treatment TP). Treatment TP
was equivalent to Treatment T except that subjects could monitor their peers using the
technology described in the previous section. The instructions for each treatment are available
online.30In order to establish predictions regarding the comparison of production levels and
Internet usage across treatments, we rely on standard incentives theory (see Laffont and
Martimort (2002) for a review). We voluntarily discard behavioral aspects such as social
preferences (Fehr and Shmidt (1999)) in establishing those predictions. This is motivated by the
fact that standard incentives theory leads to a unique set of predictions while introducing
behavioral considerations may lead to multiple conjectures.

30

http://sites.google.com/site/virtualorganization/instructions.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF THE TREATMENTS
Treatment
Individual incentives (I)
(Baseline)
Team incentives (T)
Peer monitoring (TP)

Description
Subjects were rewarded on the work task
according to their individual production.
Subjects were rewarded on the work task by
obtaining 10% of the total production in the
group session.
Subjects were rewarded according to team
incentives. In addition, they had access to the
monitoring technology.

Number of sessions
(subjects)
7 (66)
6 (60)
6 (60)

Regarding the comparison of individual and team incentives, we expect individual production
to be greater under individual incentives while Internet usage is expected to be lower. This
conjecture follows from the fact that, under team incentives, the cost of producing an additional
table is fully incurred by the subject whereas its product is shared equally among team members
(Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Holmström (1982)). The individual reward for summing up a
table correctly is equal to 40¢ under individual incentives while it is equal to 4¢ (10%×40¢)
under team incentives. In addition, given that incentives to work are stronger under individual
incentives, the opportunity cost of leisure activities is higher in that case. These conjectures are
summarized in the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1 (Individual incentives versus team incentives)
i) Production is expected to be greater under individual incentives than under team incentives.
ii) Internet usage is expected to be less pronounced under individual incentives than under team
incentives.
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Introducing behavioral considerations, we may also expect, in line with previous research,
that team incentives will perform as well as individual incentives as a result of team spirit or
team identity and interpersonal relationships among team members (Dumaine (1990, 1994),
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003), Hansen (1997), Ichniowski et al. (1996), Ichniowski,
Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Kruse (1992), Manz and Sims (1993), van Dijk, Sonnemans and van
Winden (2001)). However, none of these relevant features were introduced explicitly in our
design.
Regarding the comparison of the team incentives and the peer pressure treatments, standard
incentives theory would predict no differences both in terms of production and Internet usage. In
contrast with the work task, subjects had no monetary incentives to monitor others. Peer
monitoring was a time consuming activity either in terms of work time or in terms of leisure
time. As long as we ignore behavioral considerations, we should expect subjects to shy away
from monitoring activities because they constituted a less attractive option than either working
for cash or browsing the Internet. As a result, we should expect Treatment T and Treatment TP to
be equivalent and lead to similar production levels as well as similar Internet usage. This
conjecture is stated in the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2 (Peer monitoring)
Production as well as Internet usage are expected to be similar for the team incentives and the
peer pressure treatments.

Considering behavioral aspects may lead to different predictions. For example, one may
believe that people use monitoring as a tool to foster peer pressure and increase production as a
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result (Carpenter, Bowles and Gintis (2009) and Kandel and Lazear (1992)). At the same time,
one may expect monitoring activities to backfire generating distrust among workers. Indeed,
recent research has emphasized this negative aspect of monitoring and put forward that trusting
employees can lead to higher levels of effort than intensive supervision (Dickinson and Villeval
(2008), Falk and Kosfeld (2006), Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007a, 2007b), Frey (1993)).31 We
do not consider crowding-out of effort as our primary hypothesis because the disciplining effect
of supervision has been found to be dominant in the absence of interpersonal relationships
among workers as is the case in our experimental design (Dickinson and Villeval (2008), Frey
(1993)). In addition, crowding-out effects are likely to be stronger in a principal-agent
relationship or in any situation in which the monitor has some authority on the supervisee’s
work. In our design, we consider a multi-agent monitoring structure in which there is no
principal and no hierarchy since each subject has the same role.

2.4. Procedures
Our subject pool consisted of students from Chapman University. The experiments took place
in December 2010 and February 2011. In total, 186 subjects participated in the experiment,
divided in 17 sessions. We ran seven sessions for Treatment I, and six sessions for each of
Treatments T and TP. Ten students participated in each session, except for two sessions of 8
students that corresponded to Treatment I. The experiment was computerized using the software
Virtual Organizations developed by CYDeveloper LLC. All of the interaction was anonymous.
The instructions were displayed on subjects’ computer screen whenever all of them were
seated. Subjects had exactly 20 minutes to read the instructions. A 20-minute timer was shown
31

Crowding-out of intrinsic motivation has also been studied in the Psychology literature (Deci (1971, 1975), Deci,
Koestner and Ryan (1999)). A theoretical account of crowding-out of intrinsic motivation has been provided by
Bénabou and Tirole (2003).
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on the laboratory screen. Three minutes before the end of the instructions period, a monitor
entered into the room announcing the time remaining and handing out a printed copy of the
summary of the instructions. None of the participants asked for extra time to read the
instructions.32 At the end of the 20-minute instruction round, the experimenter closed the
instructions file from the server, and subjects typed their names to start the experiment. The
interaction between the experimenter and the participants was negligible. We estimate that only
5% of the subjects raised a question during the instructions period, and only very few subjects
asked questions during the experiment.33
At the end of the experiment, all subjects were paid their earnings in cash, rounded up to the
nearest quarter. Individual earnings at the end of the experiment are computed as the sum of the
earnings in the 5 periods. Participants earned on average $26.30, including a $7.00 show-up fee.
Participants in Treatments I, T, and TP, earned on average $27.25, $24.45, and $27.10,
respectively. Experimental sessions lasted on average two hours and ten minutes.

3. RESULTS
We start the results section by presenting a detailed analysis of the individual incentives
treatment that will serve as a benchmark for our subsequent analyses. The team incentives
treatment is analyzed in Section 3.2 and the peer pressure treatment is studied in Section 3.3. In
Section 3.4, we assess the effect of each treatment on high-, middle-, and low- performers
separately.

32

At the time the monitor entered the room, most participants had already finished reading the instructions and were
waiting the experiment to start.
33
In the majority of sessions, no questions were asked during the experiment.
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3.1. Individual Incentives
3.1.1. The Work Task and the Clicking Task
In this section we analyze the data that correspond to Treatment I (individual incentives) in
which subjects were rewarded according to their individual production on the work task (Task 2).

The Clicking Task
In each period, subjects could earn up to $2.40 by clicking on the yellow box that appeared on
their screen every 25 seconds. We summarize the earnings on the clicking task in Table 2.
TABLE 2
CLICKING TASK PERFORMANCE
Earnings on the
clicking task

% Subjects

Average performance of those
subjects on the work task

$2.40

53%

4.7

[$2.30, $2.40)

35%

3.8

[$2.10, $2.30)

9%

3.7

[$0, $210)

3%

1.5

We observe that a great majority of subjects (97%) were able to obtain at least $2.10 per
period by clicking on the yellow box. Additionally, the median performance of subjects on the
clicking task was $2.40 per period which is equivalent to clicking on the yellow box in each of
its 240 appearences during the experiment. It also follows from Table 2 that most subjects can
complete the work task while clicking on the yellow box whenever it appeared on the screen.
This was the case becaue clicking on the boxes was practically effortless as each box moved
slowly across the screen.34 In fact, subjects who achieved the maximum level of earnings on the

34

It took 25 seconds for each box to go across the screen. See video presentation of the software.
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clicking task ($2.40) obtained significantly larger earnings on the work task than other subjects
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.05).35

The Work Task
In addition to the effortless clicking task, subjects could undertake a real-effort task that
consisted in adding numbers in a table. We present descriptive statistics regarding subjects’
production on the work task in Table 3. We define total production as the monetary amount
generated by a subject’s answers on the work task divided by the reward for each correct answer
(40¢). Total production is the number of correct answers that is equivalent to the monetary gains
generated by a subject on the work task. It can be interpreted as the total number of correct tables
completed by a given subject discounted by the number of incorrect answers.
TABLE 3
PERIOD EVOLUTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION ON THE WORK TASK
Total Production Production Production Production Production Production
over 5 periods
Period 1
Period 2
Period 3
Period 4
Period 5
Median
22.0
3.5
4.5
4.5
5.0
5.5
Average
21.0
3.2
4.1
4.2
4.6
4.9
Maximum
53.5
12.0
9.0
13.0
14.5
15.5
Minimum
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Eight subjects (12%) did not produce anything on the work task explaining why the minimum
level of production was equal to zero in each of the five periods. Nevertheless, these subjects,
similarly to other participants, obtained earnings from clicking on the yellow boxes.36 In Figure
6, we show the histogram of individual production for subjects who produced at least one table

35

It may be the case that subjects who are alert and attentive tend to perform well on both tasks. Notice that subjects
with low ability on the work task may have had difficulties to complete both tasks at the same time as is suggested
by cognitive neuroscience research (Conty et al. (2010)).
36
By showing-up and clicking on the yellow boxes, subjects earn up to $19 for the experiment where $7
corresponds to the show-up fee and $12 corresponds to the clicking task.
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(88% of the sample). We do not reject the normality of the data whether we include (Jarque-Bera
test, p = 0.8613), or exclude (p = 0.4689), workers producing nothing.37

FIGURE 6.—Histogram of total individual production on the work task (excluding non
producers).
In Figure 7, we display the evolution of subjects’ average and median production across the
five periods. We observe a significant increase in both mean (28.1%) and median production
(28.6%) in the second period (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.01). This increase may be due to
learning effects as were identified in long mental arithmetic tasks (Charness and Campbell
(1988)). The learning effect faded away with time as the increase in per period average
production was significantly lower in subsequent periods.38
The summation task considered in the current experiment was significantly more complex
than in the works of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) or Erikson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009) in
which no learning effects were reported. In our task, subjects could develop strategies to sum up
the 36 numbers in the table at a faster speed. For example, subjects could decide to sum the blue

37

We obtain similar results using alternative normality tests like the D’Agostino test (p = 0.9357 and p = 0.3326,
respectively).
38
The percentage increase in period average production in periods 3, 4 and 5 was equal to 2.4%, 9.5% and 6.5%,
respectively. The p-values for the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are all lower than 0.0001.
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cells (that could be used to sum rows and columns) with arbitrary numbers and compute only the
final sum of all the numbers in the table.

FIGURE 7.—Median and average production across periods.
We observe that average and median period production tended to stagnate in the third period
before increasing again in the fourth and fifth periods. The evolution of production across
periods stresses the fact that subjects were likely to reduce their effort mid-way through the
experiment before finishing strongly. This interpretation was confirmed by running a regression
of individual production on period dummies (see Table 4). We confirm that period production
stagnated in Period 3 as is revealed by comparing the coefficient associated with Period 2 and
Period 3 dummies (p = 0.8676). In addition, the increase in average period production between
the second and third periods (2.4%) was significantly lower than the increase in period
production between any other two consecutive periods.39 We also show that production increased
significantly more in Period 5 than in Periods 1, 2 or 3.40 For example, period production is
19.5% higher in Period 5 than in Period 2. In summary, the positive trend identified in the
regression analysis (third column in the table) was mostly driven by an increase in production in
the second period as well as an increase in production in the last period.
39
40

The p-values for the corresponding Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are all lower than 0.005.
The p-value for the coefficient tests comparing Period 2 (Period 3) and Period 5 is 0.0259 (0.0402).
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TABLE 4
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL
PRODUCTION
Regression 1
Regression 2
Coefficients (P-values)
Coefficients (P-values)
Intercept

2.542*** (0.00)

2.395*** (0.00)

Trend

-

0.477*** (0.00)

Period 2

1.207*** (0.01)

-

Period 3

1.278*** (0.00)

-

Period 4

1.711*** (0.00)

-

Period 5

2.151*** (0.00)

-

Number of observations
and Log likelihood

n = 330
Left censored 66 obs
Log likelihood =
-709.559, Prob > χ² = 0.000

n = 330
Left censored 66 obs
Log likelihood =
-711.102, Prob > χ² = 0.000

The long duration of the real-effort task is likely to account for the stagnation of period
production in the middle of the experiment. The duration of our task as well as its complexity
were considerably higher than previous real-effort experiments that have used counting tasks
(Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)). It is then not surprising
to identify signs of fatigue and boredom midway in the experiment. We summarize this unique
feature of our work task as follows.

OBSERVATION 1 (Work task production)
Production on the work task gradually increased during the experiment. The most significant
increase in period production occurred in Period 2 while the most negligible increase in period
production occurred in Period 3 that corresponds to the middle of the experiment.
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In addition to the work task and the clicking task, subjects also had access to real-leisure
activities. Subjects could browse the Internet at any time during the experiment by switching to
the Internet screen using the action menu. Browsing activities are analyzed in the following
section.

3.1.2. Working or Browsing the Internet
In Figure 8, we represent the evolution of the average amount of time subjects spent browsing
the Internet.

FIGURE 8.—Average time (in %) subjects spent browsing the Internet and working on the task.
We observe an increase in the use of Internet across periods as well as within periods. In the
first two periods subjects spent 10.8% of their time on the Internet compared with an average of
18.4% in the last three periods (see Table 5). In addition, subjects’ dedication to Internet
browsing rose within periods starting at an average of 9.6% in the first fifteen minutes to reach
18.9% in the last five minutes.41,42

41

The p-value for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 0.0003.
Notice that an additional exogenous break of one minute was instituted at the end of each period during which
subjects could check their period earnings. Most subjects also used this minute to stretch.
42
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TABLE 5
DESCRIPTIVE STATICS OF INTERNET USE ACROSS PERIODS
Total
Period 1
Period 2
Period 3
Period 4
Period 5
Average
15.4%
9.6%
12.1%
17.8%
19.2%
18.2%
Standard
30.2%
24.5%
26.4%
32.3%
33.9%
32.6%
deviation
Proportion
of subjects
40.9%
59.1%
65.2%
63.6%
59.1%
59.1%
never on the
Internet
Proportion
of subjects
0.0%
6.1%
6.1%
9.1%
10.6%
9.1%
always on
the Internet
It is interesting to observe that even under individual incentives, subjects were willing to
dedicate some of their time to browsing the Internet (15.4%). Ours is the first experiment to
report a precise measurement of on-the-job leisure activities and demonstrate their significance.
Related experiments have stressed the relevance of off-the-job leisure activities that were
assessed by analyzing quitting behaviors (Dickinson (1999), Falk and Huffman (2007)) but no
studies have attempted to evaluate the importance of on-the-job leisure in a controlled
environment.
Our results show that, even in a laboratory environment usually prone to generating demand
effects, subjects were ready to undertake leisure activities for which they were not paid by the
experimenter. The introduction of Internet as an alternative activity as well as the introduction of
a clicking task that gave rewards to subjects just for the sake of being at their workstation are
crucial features of our environment. These features may have led subjects to consider leisure
activities to be as salient as the work task. Yet, a majority of subjects never consulted the Internet
(40.9%) focusing exclusively on undertaking the work task.
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We report an increase in the use of Internet from Period 3 onwards with a peak in Period 4
during which subjects spent almost 20% of their time on average on the Internet. This is
consistent with Observation 1 according to which the smallest increase in period production
occurred in Period 3. Using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we confirm that the use of Internet was
significantly larger in Period 3 than in Period 2 (p = 0.0359) while it was not significantly
different between the first and second period (p = 0.5397).43 We perform a regression analysis to
assess the evolution of Internet usage across periods and confirm the increase in Internet usage
from Period 3 onwards (see Table 6).
TABLE 6
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INTERNET USAGE PER
PERIOD
Regression 1
Regression 2
Coefficients (P-values)
Coefficients (P-values)
Intercept
0.029 (0.95)
-0.366 (0.53)
Trend
0.661*** (0.00)
Period 2
0.670 (0.25)
Period 3
2.448*** (0.00)
Period 4
2.766*** (0.00)
Period 5
2.253*** (0.00)
n = 330
n = 330
Number of observations
Right censored 8 obs
Right censored 8 obs
and Log likelihood
Log likelihood = -921.256
Log likelihood = -926.493
Prob > χ² = 0.001
Prob > χ² = 0.000
Given that browsing the Internet and working on the task were the two main activities
competing for the attention of the subjects, we expect individual production to decrease with
Internet usage. In line with this conjecture, we observe a stagnation point in period production in
the middle of the experiment that coincides with a sharp increase in Internet usage. We confirm
the negative relation between Internet usage and individual production by representing subjects’
43

We can also compare the average time each subject spent on the Internet in the first two periods with the time they
spend on Internet in the last three periods. In this case the p-value is lower than 0.0001 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test.
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average production for increasing ranges of Internet usage (see Figure A.1 in the appendix). In
addition, we report that the correlation between Internet usage and individual production was
negative and significant regardless of the methodology used to compute correlation
coefficients.44
One should not misinterpret the positive trend in both production and Internet usage as
evidence of a positive relationship between work performance and leisure. Instead, one should
recognize that the positive trend in production is mostly driven by learning effects that are
unrelated to Internet usage.45

OBSERVATION 2 (Internet usage)
i) The use of Internet started to increase significantly in the third period.
ii) The use of Internet rose sharply in the last five minutes of each period.
ii) The use of Internet was negatively correlated with individual production.

In the next section, we compare individual incentives with team incentives in terms of
production and Internet usage. The comparison between individual and team incentives
constitutes an important step in our understanding of the role of incentives in the virtual
organizations introduced in the present paper.

44

The Pearson (Spearman) [Kendall] coefficient is equal to -0.5506 (-0.3783) [-0.2687] with p < 0.0001 (p =
0.0017) [p = 0.0016].
45
In other words, we expect the positive trend in production to be steeper in the absence of Internet usage.
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3.2. Team Incentives Versus Individual Incentives
3.2.1. Individual Production Comparison
We analyze individual production in the team incentives treatment similarly to the case of
individual incentives. We provide descriptive statistics for individual production in Table 7.

Median

TABLE 7
PERIOD EVOLUTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION
Total
Production Production Production Production Production
production
Period 1
Period 2
Period 3
Period 4
Period 5
over 5 periods
14.5
1.3
2.0
2.0
3.0
3.3

Average

14.0

2.3

2.9

2.8

3.0

3.3

Maximum

33.8

6.7

8.6

8.4

7.5

7.5

Minimum

0

0

0

0

0

0

Similarly to individual incentives, period production steadily increased except for the third
period. We confirm this finding in a regression analysis of individual production with respect to
period dummies (see Table A.1 in the appendix). We observe that period production stagnated in
the third period as is revealed by comparing the coefficient associated with Period 2 and Period 3
dummies.46
We compare the time evolution of median and average production across treatments in Figure
9. Average production per period was equal to 4.2 tables under individual incentives compared
with 2.8 tables under team incentives. This corresponds to a 50% production gap between the
individual incentives treatment and the team incentives treatment. Interestingly, this gap was
observed for each of the five periods.

46

These two coefficients are not significantly different (p = 0.8621). The coefficient of the Period 3 dummy is
actually lower than the coefficient of the Period 2 dummy.
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FIGURE 9.—Comparison across treatments of median and average production per period.
In order to assess any statistical differences in individual production between the individual
incentives treatment and the team incentives treatment we use a series of statistical tests that
account for the specific nature of our data. More specifically, we use modifications of standard ttests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to the case of clustered data.47 The clustered version of the
Wilcoxon rank-sum test was performed using Datta and Satten test (2005).48 We aim at
controlling for the fact that individual production in a given session may be affected by group
production. This correction is especially relevant for the treatment with team incentives in which
case the contributions of other group members may affect an individual’s motivation. At the end
of each period, total group production was displayed on subjects’ screens. This may have led
47

Despite that fact that we cannot reject normality of individual production for the two treatments taken separately,
we provide non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests given that intra-cluster correlation may affect the validity of the
normality tests (Weiss (1978)). Using Jarque-Bera tests we do not reject normality for individual production in
Treatments I and T with the following p-values 0.8613 and 0.1846, respectively. We obtain similar results using
alternative normality tests like the D’Agostino test. Using a modification of the exact Jarque Bera test that accounts
for possible correlation in the data we reject normality for Treatments I and T in one (out of seven) and two (out of
six) sessions, respectively (we used function jbTest in R). Evidence of non-normality is stronger for the use of
Internet since applying the previous procedure, we reject normality for Treatments I and T in four and two sessions,
respectively. In addition, pooling all sessions for each treatment we reject normality at a 5% significance level using
the standard Jarque-Bera and D’Agostino test.
48
The previous authors as well as Galbraith, Daniel and Vissel (2010) provided us with R codes for the test. The
codes for the clustered t-test in R were provided by Frank Harrell who implemented the procedure used in Donner,
Birkett and Buck (1981).
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subjects to free ride whenever they observed an increase in group production as is the case in
standard public good games (see Ledyard (1995) for a survey). In particular, we report that,
under team incentives, an increase in group production in a given period decreased the
production of high performers (above the average group production) while increasing the
production of low performers (below the average group production) in the next period (see Table
A.2 in the appendix). Group production in a given period did not affect individual production in
subsequent periods in the case of individual incentives.
The comparison of individual production across treatments stresses that organizations using
individual incentives significantly outperformed those using team incentives regardless of the
test we used (see Table 8).
TABLE 8
P-VALUES FOR STATISTICAL TESTS ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN
PRODUCTION BETWEEN THE TEAM INCENTIVES AND THE
INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES TREATMENTS
Wilcoxon
Clustered
rank-sum
Wilcoxon
t-test
Clustered Wilcoxon
test
t-test
rank-sum
(group
rank-sum
t-test
(group
test
averages)
test
averages)
0.0017*** 0.0088*** 0.0018*** 0.0033*** 0.0043*** 0.0100***
This finding also holds when comparing individual production across treatments for each of the
five periods separately (see Table A.3 in the appendix). We confirm these differences across
treatments using a regression analysis (see Table 9). We introduce the dummy variable
Treatment I that takes value one if a given subject was involved in the individual incentives
treatment and zero otherwise. We also include as dependent variable a proxy of subjects’ ability
to sum up numbers (Ability factor). The ability factor is a dummy variable that takes a value of
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one if subjects completed their first table correctly.49 We show that the difference in individual
production across treatments is robust to controlling for subjects’ abilities. In line with our
interpretation of the ability factor, individuals with a high-ability factor significantly
outperformed those with low-ability factors.
TABLE 9
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR TOTAL
INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION (after the completion of the first table)
Coefficients (P-values)
Intercept
Ability factor
Treatment I
Number of observations
and Log likelihood

3.551*** (0.06)
2.124*** (0.00)
1.584*** (0.00)
n = 21
Left censored 126 obs
Log likelihood = -268.896, Prob > χ² =
0.000

We also illustrate the difference across treatments by comparing the empirical cumulative
distribution of total individual production for team and individual incentives, respectively (see
Figure 10). We reject the upper-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p = 0.0140) and confirm the
first-order stochastic dominance of subjects’ production under individual incentives over
subjects’ production under team incentives.50

49

In the treatment with individual incentives 44% of the participants completed their first table correctly compared
to 45% in the treatment with team incentives. Notice that there exists a positive relationship between the ability
factor and subjects’ final performance (see Table A.4 in the appendix) as is confirmed by the positive and significant
coefficient associated with the ability factor in the regression analysis.
50
This test has to be interpreted with caution given that our observations are not independently distributed. Indeed,
observations are clustered by sessions of 10 subjects in the team incentives treatment.
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FIGURE 10.—Comparison of empirical cumulative distribution of individual production across
treatments.
Finally, it is also the case that the proportion of subjects who did not produce anything was
higher under team incentives (21.7%) compared with individual incentives (12.1%).51 We
summarize our findings on the comparison of individual and team incentives on work task
production as follows.52

RESULT 1 (Work task production: Individual versus team incentives).
Total production was significantly greater in the individual incentives treatment than in the team
incentives treatment. This result also holds when analyzing each period separately.

This result is a necessary starting point in the experimental analysis of organizations as it
identifies conditions under which individual incentives largely outperformed team incentives.
51

Using a standard proportion test without correcting for possible clustering effects, the difference is not significant
(p = 0.2315).
52
Notice that we do not present a comparison of individual and team incentives regarding the performance on the
clicking task since, independently of the treatment, subjects clicked on the yellow box as soon as it appeared on their
screen (See Table A.5 in the appendix for more detail).
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Organizations using individual incentives produced 52% more on average than those using
individual incentives. To our knowledge, this is the first time this result is established in a
controlled environment. This result is not surprising in the light of incentive theory (Hypothesis
1) but constitutes an essential step in the empirical analysis of incentives given the limited
evidence of free riding behaviors in teams (Dohmen and Falk (2011), Dumaine (1990, 1994),
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003), Hansen (1997), Ichniowski et al. (1996), Ichniowski,
Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Kruse (1992), Manz and Sims (1993), van Dijk, Sonnemans and van
Winden (2001)). Result 1 suggests that our experimental environment is well suited in order to
identify incentives effects and could prove to be a privileged platform for an empirical
assessment of the theory of incentives.
Given the negative effect of Internet usage on individual production identified in the case of
individual incentives, we expect the difference in individual production across treatments to be
reflected in the use of Internet. The comparison of Internet usage across treatments is analyzed in
more detail in the next section.

3.2.2. Internet Usage Comparison
We illustrate the sharp differences in Internet usage under individual and team incentives in
Figure 11. Under team incentives subjects spent 28.5% of their time on average to browse the
Internet while this percentage was only equal to 15.4% under individual incentives. Under team
incentives, subjects dedicated an average of 19.1% of their time to Internet activities in the first
two periods compared with 34.8% in the last three periods. The proportion of their time subjects
dedicated to Internet usage under team incentives (28.5%) was remarkably similar to the figures
published in the 2005 study by American Online and Salary.com according to which employees
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spend about 26.1% of their time on activities unrelated to their work (Malachowski (2005)).53,54
Notice that in our environment, Internet usage was the only leisure activity available to workers.

FIGURE 11.—Average time (in %) spent by subjects browsing the internet for individual and
team incentives treatments.
Similarly to the treatment with individual incentives, we find a positive trend in Internet usage
(see Table A.6 in the appendix).55 Internet usage increased significantly from Period 2
onwards.56 Similarly to the case of individual incentives, we find a sharp increase in Internet
usage in the last five minutes of each period during which subjects spent 39% of their time on the
web compared with 25% on average during the first fifteen minutes.57
We reject the hypothesis that Internet usage was identical for individual and team incentives
(see Table A.7 in the appendix). Under team incentives, Internet usage was about twice higher
53

Almost half of this time corresponds to Internet browsing.
In addition, 85% of the subjects in the team incentives treatment decided to browse the Internet during the
experiment. This figure is close to the 2005 study by Web@Work that reports that 93% of the workers admit to visit
Internet web pages during their work day.
55
Similarly to the case of individual incentives, we report a negative correlation between Internet usage and
individual production since Pearson (Spearman) [Kendall] coefficients are equal to -0.6580 (-0.4754) [-0.6721] with
p < 0.0001 in each case.
56
Under individual incentives, the increase in Internet usage occurred one period later as the period dummies were
significant from Period 3 onwards (see Table 6).
57
The p-value for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is inferior to 0.0001.
54
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than under individual incentives. In addition, Internet usage was significantly lower under
individual incentives for each of the five periods analyzed separately (see Table A.8 in the
appendix). In addition, we find that the positive trend was significantly more pronounced for
Internet usage in the team incentives treatment compared with individual incentives (p = 0.0142).
This implies that the treatment effect tended to become stronger over time as subjects’ fatigue
and boredom was rising. This result follows from the regression in Table 10.
TABLE 10
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INTERNET USE
PER PERIOD
Coefficients (P-values)
Intercept

0.578 (0.41)

Trend
Treatment
(Dummy that takes value one if
treatment is individual
incentives)
Trend×Treatment

1.178*** (0.00)

Number of observations
and Log likelihood

-1.223 (0.21)
-0.510** (0.03)
n = 630
Right censored 31 obs
Log likelihood = -1882.731, Prob > χ² =
0.000

We summarize our findings regarding the effect of team incentives on Internet usage as
follows.

RESULT 2 (Internet usage: Individual versus team incentives).
i) The use of Internet was significantly lower in the individual incentives treatment compared
with team incentives. This result also holds when analyzing each period separately.
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ii) The increase in Internet usage over time was significantly more pronounced in the team
incentives treatment than in the individual incentives treatment.

This finding emphasizes that, in an environment with a long and real-effort task in which
fatigue was likely to arise, high-powered incentives were very effective in bringing down
Internet usage. Indeed, subjects spent almost twice as long on Internet under team incentives than
under individual incentives. In sum, shirking behaviors prevailed in the presence of low-powered
incentives schemes.
This result is fundamental as it shows that increasing the level of realism in the experimental
environment leads to results that are consistent with incentives theory (see Holmström (1979),
and Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review).
As a final step of our analysis, we introduce peer pressure in the virtual organization in order
to assess whether the performance of organizations using team incentives can be enhanced by the
use of real-time peer monitoring.

3.3. Peer Pressure
We start the analysis of peer monitoring by providing general statistics on watching activities.
The analysis of production levels and Internet usage is completed in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3,
respectively.

3.3.1. Watching Activities
Subjects dedicated an average of 4.4% of their time to watching activities. They monitored
others 5.7 times during the experiment for an average duration of 46 seconds per watching

43

episode. In addition, subjects were watched an average of 49.4 times for a total duration of 22
minutes and 24 seconds. Interestingly, peer pressure did not fade away over time.58 The amount
of time subjects spent watching others did not decline over time as is confirmed by comparing
watching activities across periods (see Table 11). We cannot reject the hypothesis that the
amount of time subjects dedicated to watching activities was the same across periods.59
TABLE 11
PERIOD EVOLUTION OF WATCHING ACTIVITY
Amount of time
spent watching in Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
% of total time

Period 4

Period 5

Average

4.4%

4.2%

3.3%

4.4%

4.3%

5.6%

Proportion of
subjects never
watching

11.7%

31.7%

36.7%

31.7%

36.7%

31.7%

The monitoring effort was shared among a large majority (88.3%) of subjects. The proportion
of subjects who did not watch any other subject did not increase overtime and remained constant
at a value close to one-third. Considering the experiment as a whole, only 11.7% (7 out of 60) of
the subjects did not spend any time monitoring their peers. If free riding of monitoring activities
had been prevalent, we would have observed a decrease in monitoring across periods as subjects
would tend to rely on other workers to maintain the level of peer pressure. In our experiments,
free riding on monitoring activities was limited because monitoring costs were shared among
team members. Subjects who monitored others had to leave the work task screen affecting their
productivity negatively. Given that subjects were paid according to team incentives any decline

58

Watching activities were actually higher in the last period than in the previous four periods (see Table 11). This
difference is not significant, however (p = 0.7100 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
59
We ran Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to compare the average amount of time subjects spent watching others in each
period. To avoid clustering issues we analyze watching activities at the session level. We ran a total of ten tests and
no p-values were below 0.20, except for the test comparing average watching times between Periods 2 and 5 (p =
0.0940), giving weak support for the fact that subjects watched others more on average in Period 5 than in Period 2.
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in production due to monitoring activities would affect all workers in the same magnitude. Our
environment differs from the model presented by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) in which subjects
who are paid according to their individual contribution would incur an individual cost for
undertaking monitoring activities. Public good games with punishments also consider the case in
which the cost for sanctioning other subjects is fully incurred by the individual punisher (Fehr
and Gächter (2000)).
Interestingly, it was unlikely for subjects to watch the same person at the same time. This
occurred only in 16.7% of the watching episodes. It is then not surprising to report that all
subjects were watched during the experiment for a minimum duration as high as 12 minutes (that
is, 12% of the experiment time). In addition, the average proportion of subjects that were being
watched in a given minute was equal to 44.8%, while subjects’ dedication to monitoring
activities was limited to 4.4% of their time. This occurred because most watchers (94.2%)
decided to monitor all subjects at the same time. As a result, the amount of time subjects were
being watched during the experiment was similar across subjects.60 In particular, subjects with
different levels of performance were being watched for the same amount of time. It was not the
case that either low- or high- performers were more likely to be watched by others. We test this
conjecture by means of a regression analysis in which we introduce as dependent variables the
amount of time subjects were watching others as well as the amount of time they were being
watched by others (see Table A.9 in the appendix).61
Finally, it is interesting to note that subjects were as likely to be watched at the beginning, in
the middle or at the end of each period (see Figure 12). More precisely, we analyze whether the
60

In our experimental design, subjects could watch the other nine subjects at the same time by clicking on the
monitor all button. In a related study (in progress), we focused on the specificities of the watching mechanism, we
restrict the monitoring technology so that subjects can only watch a subset of coworkers at the same time.
61
We use a 5-minute time frame to assess the impact of past performance on watching others or being watched by
others. The relationship between watching activities and subjects’ performance ranks is provided in Section 3.4
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pattern of watching activities within a period followed a random pattern by using a random order
test.62 To that end, we define an indicator variable that takes value one if a subject has been
watching others in a given minute of a given period and takes value zero otherwise. Then, we
analyze for each period of each of the six sessions (that is a total of 30 observations) whether the
order of watching times followed a random order. We find that 25 out of 30 periods are
characterized by random watching times. Therefore, we conclude that the pattern of watching
times tended to follow a random order.We summarize our findings regarding watching activities
as follows.

RESULT 3 (Watching activities)
i) Watching activities were limited to a small percentage (4.4%) of subjects’ available time.
Nevertheless, all subjects were being watched during the experiment for an average of 22
minutes and 24 seconds (that is, 22.4% of the duration of the experiment).
ii) Watching activities did not fade away across periods.
iii) The pattern of watching activities followed a random order.

These results suggest that subjects were willing to exert peer pressure on others at any point
during the experiment. If subjects had only been interested in feedback about their relative
performance they may have used very short watching episodes concentrated toward the end of
each period. Following this strategy, subjects could have gathered all the information necessary
to assess their relative performance in a short amount of time. Instead, we find that subjects were
being watched extensively during the whole experiment.

62

We use the random order test in STATA and we consider that the pattern of watching in a given period is not
random whenever the test rejects the null hypothesis at a 5% significance level (Swed and Eisenhart (1943)).
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FIGURE 12.—Average proportion of subjects being watched in a given minute across periods
and across sessions.

3.3.2. Comparison of Individual Production Across Treatments
Similarly to previous treatments, we find that individual production in the peer pressure
treatment increased overtime with the exception of Period 3 as is illustrated in Figure 13.

FIGURE 13.—Median and average production per period for all treatments.
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We confirm the increase in production across periods by running a regression of individual
production on period dummies and a trend (see Table A.10 in the appendix). We confirm that
period production stagnated in Period 3 as is revealed by comparing the coefficient associated
with Period 2 and Period 3 dummies (p = 0.9160).
More importantly, we find that the peer pressure treatment is characterized by significantly
higher levels of production than team incentives while no significant differences are found
between peer pressure and individual incentives treatments (see statistical analysis in Table A.11
in the appendix). Average (median) production was 47% (46%) larger in the peer pressure
treatment than in the team incentives treatment. Additionally, average and median production
under peer pressure (20.6 and 21, respectively) were remarkably close to the values obtained
under individual incentives (21 and 22, respectively).
We confirm the effect of peer pressure by running a Tobit regression in which we control for
the ability of the subjects (see Table A.12 in the appendix). Notice that our results hold not only
for total production but also for each period analyzed separately (see Table A.13 in the
appendix). We conclude that peer effects did not vanish across periods since average (4.62) and
median (5) production in the last period were significantly greater in the peer pressure treatment
than in the team incentives treatment (3.28 and 3.25, respectively). Additionally, average
production was 47.3% higher in the last two periods and 46.7% higher in the first two periods
under the peer pressure treatment compared with the team incentives treatment.
Finally, we represent the empirical cumulative distribution of individual production across
treatments in the following graph (see Figure 14). We reject the upper-tailed KolmogorovSmirnov test (p = 0.0380) and confirm the first-order stochastic dominance of individual
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production in the peer pressure treatment compared with the team incentives treatment.63
However, we find no significant differences between the individual incentives and the peer
pressure treatments (p = 0.5845).

FIGURE 14.—Empirical cumulative distribution of individual production for all treatments.
We summarize our findings in the statement of Result 4.

RESULT 4 (Individual production: Peer pressure versus team and individual incentives)
i) Individual production was significantly greater in the peer pressure treatment than in the team
incentives treatment. Positive peer effects did not vanish with time.
ii) Individual production was not significantly different between the peer pressure and the
individual incentives treatments. This result also holds when analyzing each period separately.

The introduction of peer monitoring in our experimental design appeared to be a very
effective tool that permitted organizations using team incentives to reach efficient levels of
63

Again, this test has to be interpreted with caution given that our observations are clustered by experimental
sessions.
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production.64 This result is practically relevant for managers who usually possess limited
information about individual contributions, and as a result, cannot rely on individual incentives
schemes.
To our knowledge, this is the first time this result is established empirically. Evidence of
positive peer effects has been identified in field studies (Falk and Ichino (2006), Mas and Moretti
(2009)), but none of these works have examined peer monitoring as a mechanism to resolve free
riding in teams. It is also interesting to observe that we obtained strong peer monitoring effects in
the absence of punishment devices or threats. It is indeed well known that punishments can be
very effective in increasing contributions in public good games (Fehr and Gächter (2000),
Masclet et al. (2003), Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007)). Notice that in field studies such as the
one designed by Mas and Moretti (2009), workers were not anonymous and could potentially
face retaliation for non-cooperative behaviors. In our design, subjects were anonymous and this
prevented any form of retaliation after the experiment. In contrast to field studies (Falk and
Ichino (2006), Mas and Moretti (2009)) and public good games with threats (Masclet et al.
(2003)), subjects were not allowed to communicate in our experiment. Finally, our peer
monitoring technology did not rely on physical proximity and face to face interactions. Instead,
subjects remained seated at their workstation while monitoring others. Supervisees simply
received a notification on their screen that they were currently being watched by another subject.
The fact that our monitoring technology was highly effective despite the absence of physical
proximity and face to face communication is especially relevant given the growing interest for
virtual monitoring devices within firms.65

64

We interpret the level of production obtained under individual incentives as the efficient level.
A large number of programs such as Spectorsoft, Virtual Monitoring™, Employee Monitoring or Webwatcher are
already available to monitor employees’ activities. An early account of computer-based monitoring systems was
considered in Chalykoff and Kochan (1989).
65
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Our result is related to the audience effects documented in the literature in social facilitation,
starting with the seminal works of Zajonc (1965, 1980). The author puts forward that a subject’s
performance on a given task is likely to be affected by the presence of others. In particular,
Zajonc stresses that the presence of others affects performance positively for simple and welllearnt tasks while affecting performance negatively for more complex tasks. Our result regarding
the positive effect or peer pressure on individual production is consistent with Zajonc’s social
facilitation theory if we consider summing numbers as a well-learnt task for a pool of
undergraduate students. This finding is particularly striking if we take into account that monitors
were not physically present at supervisees’ workstations in contrast with the context envisioned
by Zajonc in his theory of audience effects. Our findings suggest that the presence effects
highlighted by Zajonc are robust to the case of virtual monitoring.
Despite the fact that our monitoring mechanism involves no physical proximity and no face to
face interaction it constitutes a stronger mechanism than devices that simply rely on cues of
being watched without implementing real supervision. Recent studies show that cues of being
watched such as the display of the picture of eyes on the subject’s screen (Bateson, Nettle and
Roberts (2006)) tends to increase cooperative behaviors in a context in which students were
collecting money for drinks. Relatedly, Burnham and Hare (2007) find evidence of increased
cooperation in a public good game experiment in which the picture of a robot’s face with
prominent eyes was displayed on the screen. These findings suggest that not only being watched
by others but cues of being watched may increase cooperative behavior. In our experimental
design, we did not use cues as subjects knew that the eye picture only appeared when other
subjects were currently watching them. Subjects who were being watched by others were
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informed about the experiment ID of the watchers so as to eliminate speculations regarding the
possible attempt of the experimenter to use deceptive strategies.
Our result can also be interpreted in the light of audience effects reported by economists who
stress that people may like to be perceived by others as altruistic and fair (Andreoni and
Bernheim (2009), Levine (1998)). In our environment, subjects may have been willing to signal
themselves as hard-working and cooperative to the person that was watching them. Relatedly,
the power of peer pressure as was initially described by Kandel and Lazear (1992) is linked to
the power of shame (Tadelis (2011)) by which workers may feel uncomfortable contributing less
than the group average and decide to work harder as a result. The positive effect of peer
monitoring is also consistent with early research in Sociology stressing that group incentives lead
to low levels of shirking. Indeed, members of a work group tend to feel as if they shared a
common fate, responding to peer pressure by increasing their contribution to the group because
of the fear of disapproval from other members (Homans (1951), Roy (1953), Whyte (1955)).66
Result 4 is also in line with empirical evidence suggesting that mutual monitoring in work
groups has been a decisive factor in the success of low-powered firm-wide incentives schemes as
is described in the case of Continental Airlines (Knez and Simester (2001)). The authors mention
shame as well as sanctioning as possible mechanisms inducing positive peer pressure. In this
paper, we shed light on the relevance of peer pressure effects in a controlled environment in
which subjects could not sanction their partners monetarily nor threat them verbally.
Furthermore, we investigate the impact of watching episodes on individual production during
the experiment. We perform a regression analysis in which we use as independent variables the
amount of time subjects spent watching others as well as the amount of time subjects were being
watched by others. This regression analysis allows us to disentangle the effect of watching others
66

This position has been later criticized (e.g. Orr (2001)).
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from the effect of being watched by others. In addition, we are able to study the dynamic
structure of the effect of watching activities on individual production.
In our analysis, we use a 5-minute time frame so as to assess the impact of watching activities
on real-time production.67 The independent variables related to watching activities are referred to
as Watching and Being watched. These variables measure the amount of time (in seconds) that a
subject spent watching others (Watching) and the amount of time (in seconds) a subject was
watched (Being watched) by at least one subject in a given time span of five minutes. We
introduce independent variables with lags so as to mitigate possible endogeneity issues.68 We
include a trend as independent variable so as to control for the steady increase of production
across periods.69 Finally, we control for subjects’ ability by adding the ability factor as
independent variable. We provide the estimates for the regression analysis in Table 12.70We
conclude from our regression analysis that being watched by others affected individual
production positively in the next five to ten minutes. The delay in the impact of watching
activities can be accounted for the time subjects needed to produce a table (4 minutes and 3
seconds on average) and increase individual production as a result. Furthermore, subjects who
responded positively to peer monitoring by switching from the Internet screen to the work task

67

Notice that an analysis with shorter time intervals (e.g. intervals of one minute) may not be adequate since
subjects need on average 4 minutes and 3 seconds to complete a table.
68
Endogeneity issues may arise if we introduce the current amount of time subjects spent watching others as well as
the current amount of time they were being watched by others as independent variables. Indeed, one may expect that
individual production could cause changes in watching behaviors. For example, subjects with low levels of
production may feel ashamed (Kandel and Lazear (1992)) and decide to avoid consulting the performance of others.
69
Similar results are obtained when controlling for beginning or end of period effects. For example, the nature of
our results is unchanged when introducing in our regression analysis a dummy variable that takes value one if the
five minute time span corresponds to the first (last) five minutes of the period.
70
A number of other specifications have been considered such as including up to three lags in the independent
variables or adding group production in the previous period as regressors. These specifications gave similar results.
We also used dynamic panel data models with Arellano-Bond (1991) estimation technique. However, this estimation
technique was not successful in fully eliminating residual autocorrelation as we may expect given the limited
number of instrumental variables at our disposal.
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may have needed an additional amount of time to bring their concentration back to the task (see
Table 13 in Section 3.3.3).
TABLE 12
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL
PRODUCTION IN A 5-MINUTE TIME SPAN
Coefficients (P-values)
Intercept
Being watched in t-1
Being watched in t-2
Watching in t-1
Watching in t-2
Ability factor
Trend

-0.8032*** (0.00)
0.0005 (0.39)
0.0017*** (0.01)
-0.0014 (0.35)
0.0012 (0.45)
1.8408*** (0.00)
0.0659*** (0.02)

Number of observations
and Log likelihood

n = 1080
398 left censored obs
Log likelihood = -1324.595, Prob > χ² = 0.000

Our results confirm that the significant difference in production levels between the team
incentives treatment and the peer monitoring treatment can be accounted for by the pressure
imposed by team partners on each other. Notice that we cannot discard the possibility that
subjects reacted to the threat of peer monitoring rather than its effective implementation.
However, we know that subjects were being watched extensively during the experiment (22.4%
of their time) so that a significant part of the effect of peer monitoring is likely to be due to its
actual implementation.
Interestingly, watching others did not seem to affect the production of the watchers in the
following minutes. This result stresses that the release of feedback about relative performance is
not the driving force underlying the effect of peer monitoring on individual production. Instead,
the effectiveness of peer monitoring seems to rely on effective social pressure exemplified by the
positive reaction of subjects to the fact that they are being watched by others.

54

We summarize our findings in the next result.

RESULT 5. (The effects of watching others and being watched by others)
i) The more time subjects were being watched by others in a given time span of five minutes the
more they were producing in the next five to ten minutes.
ii) Watching others in a given time span of five minutes did not affect one’s own production in
the following minutes.

It is important to stress that the analysis summarized in Result 5 was made possible by the
unique features of our design. In particular, the introduction of real-time monitoring in a
controlled environment allowed us to detail the mechanics of watching activities and shed light
on peer effects as a result. To our knowledge this is the first time such a controlled analysis of the
real-time effects of peer pressure is being undertaken.

3.3.3. Comparison of Internet Usage Across Treatments
Peer monitoring had a considerable impact on Internet usage. The average proportion of time
subjects spent on Internet was 54% lower in the peer pressure treatment than in the team
incentives treatment. We find significant differences in Internet usage between peer pressure and
team incentives treatments whether considering total Internet usage (see Table A.14 in the
appendix) or Internet usage per period (see Table A.15 in the appendix).
Interestingly, the evolution of Internet usage was remarkably similar for the peer pressure and
the individual incentives treatments (see Figure 15). Internet usage was actually less intensive
under peer pressure (13.1%) compared to individual incentives (15.4%) although this difference
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was not significant. We do not find any significant differences in Internet usage between peer
pressure and individual incentives treatments whether considering total Internet usage (see Table
A.14 in the appendix) or Internet usage per period (see Table A.15 in the appendix).

FIGURE 15.—Time evolution of average Internet usage (in %) for all treatments.
Similarly to previous treatments, we identify a positive trend in Internet usage (see Table A.16
and Table A.17 in the appendix).71 The proportion of time subjects dedicated to Internet in the
first two periods was as low as 7.7% on average compared to 16.7% in the last three periods. We
also report a sharp increase in Internet browsing in the last five minutes during which subjects
spent 18.6% of their time on the web compared to 10.3% on average during the first fifteen
minutes.72
We analyze whether peer watching affects subjects’ use of the Internet during the experiment.
In particular, we assess whether being watched in a given 5-minute time span led subjects to
switch to the work task screen in the following five minutes.73 In Table 13, we display the results
71

In line with previous treatments, we also report a negative correlation between Internet usage and individual
production since Pearson (Spearman) [Kendall] coefficients are equal to -0.5685 (-0.6443) [-0.4501] with p <
0.0001 in each case.
72
The p-value for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is inferior to 0.0001.
73
Similar results are obtained using a minute analysis.
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of a Logistic regression where the variable Work task is a dummy variable that takes value one if
the corresponding subject was on the Work task screen in a given 5-minute time span and zero
otherwise. We use dummy variables for each time frame of five minutes so as to control for the
rising use of Internet within a given period. We find that, the more time a subject was being
watched in a given 5-minute time span the more likely he or she was to be on the Work task
screen in the following five minutes. This is the case since the coefficient associated with Being
watched is positive and significant.
TABLE 13
LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR PER
MINUTE ACTIVITES
Dependent variable:
Coefficients (P-values)
Work task in t
Intercept
5.702 *** (0.00)
Being watched in t-1
0.008*** (0.00)
0.769*** (0.00)
Individual production in t-1
Trend (Period)
-0.601*** (0.00)
Dummy Minute 6 to 10
0.148 (0.78)
Dummy Minute 11 to 15
-0.893* (0.06)
Dummy Minute 16 to 20
-1.191** (0.01)
Number of observations
n = 1140
and Log likelihood
-172.568, Prob > χ² = 0.000
The introduction of peer monitoring in our experimental design brings down Internet usage.
This result stresses that organizations can limit shirking behaviors by using peer monitoring. This
is an important finding given the growing concern for cyber-slacking (Malachowski (2005),
Young (2006)). Our analysis suggests that, in contrast to other supervision mechanisms, peer
monitoring does not induce crowding-out of effort. Evidence of the negative impact of
supervision policies on employees’ effort have been encountered in the experimental literature
(Dickinson and Villeval (2008), Falk and Kosfeld (2006), Frey (1993)). These authors stress that
supervision policies may be perceived as a signal of distrust and, as a result, undermine workers’
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effort. Frey (1993) as well as Dickinson and Villeval (2008) put forward that the crowding-out
effect that results from monitoring activities dominates its disciplining effect when there exist
interpersonal relationships between managers and employees whereas the opposite tends to be
true in the absence of such relationships. In that respect, our findings are consistent with the
works of Frey (1993) and Dickinson and Villeval (2008) since our experimental design is
characterized by the absence of interpersonal relationships among workers.
Furthermore, we believe that crowding-out effects are likely to be stronger in a principal-agent
relationship or in any organizational structure in which the monitor has some authority over the
supervisee’s work. By contrast, our design is characterized by a multi-agent monitoring structure
in which there is no principal and no hierarchy since each subject has the same role. In that
context, we show that the disciplining effect of peer monitoring dominates the crowding-out
effect.
We summarize our findings as follows.

RESULT 6 (Internet usage: Peer pressure versus team and individual incentives)
i) The use of Internet was significantly lower in the peer pressure treatment than in the team
incentives treatment. Internet usage was not significantly different between the peer pressure and
the individual incentives treatments.
ii) Subjects were more likely to switch from Internet to the work task if they had been watched by
others in the previous minute.
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In the next section, we provide a comparison of the three treatments by analyzing high-,
middle- and low- performers separately. Our aim is to assess whether treatment effects are
confined to subjects with certain levels of performance.

3.4 Analysis by Performance Ranks
We first compare treatments in terms of production and Internet usage across three categories
of subjects’ relative standings. We classify subjects according to their relative performance using
the concept of ranks. More specifically, we pool the top three performers of each experimental
session in the high-rank category and the bottom three performers in the low-rank category.
Subjects that do not belong to either one of these two categories are grouped together and referred
to as middle ranks.74,75 Unsurprisingly, the average performance of subjects is significantly
different across rank categories. For example, the performance of high-rank subjects in
Treatments I, T and TP are on average 66%, 112%, and 69% higher than the performance of
middle-rank subjects, respectively (see Figure 16).76
We observe that the individual incentives treatment significantly outperformed the team
incentives treatment for each rank category. Under individual incentives, median (average)
production for high and middle ranks was 21% and 65% (27% and 63%) greater than under team
incentives. Median production for low rank producers was equal to zero under individual

74

Notice that all sessions involved groups of ten subjects except two sessions with 8 subjects in the individual
incentives treatment. For these two sessions, we have only two low- and two high- rank subjects instead of three and
three, respectively.
75
The pooling of subjects in rank categories is motivated by the fact that analyzing each rank separately would leave
us with only one observation per experimental session. For our statistical analysis we prefer to consider only three
categories of ranks: low, middle and high. Notice that we obtain similar results with different definitions of rank
categories. For example, the qualitative nature of our results hold when grouping the top two performers and the
bottom two performers in the high-rank and in the low-rank categories, respectively.
76
Additionally, rank categories are closely related to the ability factor. The proportion of high-ability-factor subjects
is significantly different across rank categories since p = 0.0149 for the proportion test comparing low and middle
ranks for all treatments and p = 0.0041 for the test comparing middle and low ranks for all treatments.
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incentives while it was equal to 10 under team incentives.77 In addition, the peer pressure
treatment outperformed the team incentives treatment for both middle and high ranks by 28% and
57% (27% and 63%) in median (average) terms.78 However, peer pressure and team incentives
led to similarly low levels of performance for low-rank subjects with median production levels as
low as 0.5 and 0.0, respectively.79 Using both clustered t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests we
confirm that, for low-rank subjects, production was significantly greater under individual
incentives than under peer pressure.80

FIGURE 16.—Median and average total production per ranks and across treatments.
Interestingly, a closer look at low-rank subjects in the peer pressure treatment reveals that,
despite producing less than in the individual incentives treatment, their use of Internet was not
significantly different between the two treatments (see Figure 17).81 At the same time, low-rank

77

When comparing individual incentives with team incentives for high ranks, we report that p = 0.0072 and p=
0.0409 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test, respectively. For middle ranks, the
corresponding p-values are p = 0.0011 and p= 0.0316, while for low ranks we obtain p = 0.0001 and p= 0.0098.
78
When comparing peer pressure with team incentives for high ranks, we report that p = 0.0072 and p= 0.0409 for
the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test, respectively. For middle ranks, the corresponding pvalues are p = 0.0011 and p= 0.0316.
79
In that case, p = 0.3011 and p= 0.3008 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
respectively.
80
We report that p = 0.0032 and p= 0.0561 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
respectively.
81
p = 0.8226 and p = 0.7242 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test, respectively.
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subjects in both the individual incentives and the peer pressure treatments browsed the Internet
significantly less on average (about 29% of their time) than in the team incentives treatment (48%
of their time).82

FIGURE 17.—Average use of Internet in % of the total time (on the left panel) across ranks and
treatments and average watching time and Internet use by ranks (on the right panel).
Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that, even though low-rank subjects performed
significantly worse in the peer pressure treatment compared with the individual incentives
treatment, they did not differ in the total number of tables they completed. In Treatment TP, lowrank subjects completed an average of 18.8 tables compared with 18.3 under individual
incentives. However, the percentage of incorrect answers was significantly greater in the peer
pressure treatment (68%) compared with individual incentives (56%). The percentage of errors in
the peer pressure treatment was similar to the case of team incentives (72%).83,84 Nonetheless, the

82

For the comparison of the individual incentives (peer pressure) treatment with the team incentives treatment, we
obtain that p = 0.0062 and p= 0.0301 (p = 0.0225 and p= 0.1157) for the clustered t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum
test, respectively.
83
The p-values for the corresponding clustered t-tests are equal to 0.0116 and 0.2130.
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total number of tables completed was significantly greater in the peer pressure treatment (18.8)
compared with the team incentives treatment (13.4).85 In summary, subjects who were involved in
the peer pressure treatment tried more on the work task than subjects who did not face peer
pressure, but their level of accuracy was not significantly increased.86 These findings are
consistent with Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009) who show that providing continuous
feedback about others’ performance to low performers decreased their level of accuracy in a
summation task similar to the one used in the current experiment.87
Notice that the poor performance of low-rank subjects in the peer pressure treatment is not
driven by differences in watching activities. Indeed, subjects were being monitored for the same
amount of time independently of their rank. In particular, high-rank subjects were being watched
for 22.3 minutes on average while middle-rank subjects and low-rank subjects were being
watched for 22.8 and 21.9 minutes, respectively.88 It is also the case that subjects belonging to
different rank categories do not differ regarding the average amount of time they spent watching
others. Low-, middle- and high- rank subjects spent on average 3.8, 3.7 and 5.8 minutes watching
others. These differences are not significant.89

84

It is also the case for each of the three treatments that high-rank (middle-rank) subjects are characterized by a
significantly lower percentage of errors and a significantly greater number of total answers compared to middle-rank
(low-rank) subjects. We do not report these results because of space constraints.
85
The p-value for the corresponding one-sided clustered t-test is equal to 0.0325.
86
Notice that a similar result is obtained if we pool subjects according to their ability factor instead of their rank
category. For low-ability subjects, the percentage of incorrect answers under individual incentives is equal to 44.3%
while it is equal to 56.2% and 60.9% for Treatments TP and T, respectively.
87
Bandiera, Larcinese and Rasul (2010) do not report any positive effect of individual feedback on students’
performance in the case of low performers. In a related study, Azmat and Iriberri (2010) identify positive effects of
feedback on relative performance for the whole range of ability levels. Sacerdote (2001), Tran and Zeckhauser
(2009) and Zimmerman (2003) also report positive peer effects.
88
These differences are not significant. We use clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test and obtain p = 0.5360 when
comparing low and middle ranks, and p = 0.3709 when comparing low and high ranks. The p-value for the
comparison of middle and high ranks was equal to 0.5819. Similar results are obtained using clustered t-tests.
89
Notice that median watching times are equal to 3.8, 3.7 and 3.4, respectively. Using a clustered t-test (clustered
Wilcoxon rank-sum test) we obtain p = 0.7586 (p = 0.2441) when comparing low and middle ranks while p = 0.1520
(p = 0.4758) when comparing low and high ranks, and p = 0.1860 (p = 0.6838) when comparing middle and high
ranks.

62

In line with recent research in cognitive neurosciences (Conty et al. (2010)), one may think
that low performers may be particularly sensitive to the distractive effect of the notification that
appeared on their screen whenever they were being watched. Indeed, the display of the eye
picture was likely to employ subjects’ cognitive resources and may, as a result, have worked as a
powerful distracter for subjects characterized by low levels of ability on the task.

FIGURE 18.—Average number of correct and incorrect answers by ranks.
The negative effect of peer monitoring on low-rank subjects is also related to Zajonc’s social
facilitation theory (1965, 1980). According to Zajonc’s theory, subjects become more active
when they are being watched by others. As a result, subjects facing a difficult (easy) task are
expected to provide an increased number of incorrect (correct) answers as a result of peer
monitoring.Therefore, low-rank subjects who were likely to perceive the task as being difficult
provided significantly more incorrect answers in the peer pressure treatment (13.4) than in the
team incentives treatment (9.2).90 In sum, low-rank subjects were more active when they were
being watched by others but this increased level of alertness fostered inaccuracies. To the
contrary and in line with Zajonc’s theory, high- and middle rank subjects who were likely to

90

The (one-sided) p-values are equal to 0.0588 and 0.0883 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon ranksum test, respectively. Low-rank subjects were likely to perceive the task that consists in summing 36 numbers as
difficult since a majority of them had low levels of ability on the task.
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perceive the task as easy, completed more tables and achieved a greater level of accuracy in the
peer pressure treatment than in the team incentives treatment (see Figure 18).91
We confirm this interpretation of our findings by separately analyzing the impact of watching
activities on individual production for low-rank and middle to high rank subjects.92 We provide
the regression estimates in the appendix (Table A.18). In line with social facilitation theory, we
observe that being watched by others affected individual production negatively for subjects who
were low performers while the opposite was true for middle to high performers.

RESULT 7 (Peer pressure versus team incentives and individual incentives across ranks)
i) (High and Middle Rank: Production) Production was significantly greater in the peer pressure
treatment than in the team incentives treatment for high- and middle- ranks. We found no
differences in individual production between the peer pressure treatment and the individual
incentives treatment.
ii) (High and Middle Rank: Internet) Internet usage was significantly lower in the peer pressure
treatment than in the team incentives treatment for high- and middle- rank categories. We found
no differences in Internet usage between the peer pressure treatment and the individual
incentives treatment.
ii) (Low Rank: Production) Production was not significantly different in the peer pressure
treatment than in the team incentives treatment. However, production was significantly lower in

91

Comparing the number of tables completed across treatments, we obtain (one-sided) p-values equal to 0.0031 and
0.0198 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test, respectively. Comparing inaccuracy rates,
we obtain (one-sided) p-values equal to 0.0439 and 0.0671 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon ranksum test, respectively.

92

We completed this regression analysis in Section 3.3.2 (Table 12) for the whole sample of subjects.
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the peer pressure treatment as well as in the team incentives treatment than in the individual
incentives treatment.
iii) (Low Rank: Internet) Internet usage was significantly lower in the peer pressure treatment
than in the team incentives treatment. However, we found no differences in Internet usage
between the peer pressure treatment and the individual incentives treatment.
v) The more time low-rank subjects were being watched by others in a given time span the less
they produced in the following minutes. The opposite was true for high- and middle- rank
subjects.

4. CONCLUSIONS
The primary objective of this research endeavor was to propose an empirical methodology for
the analysis of organizational issues in the laboratory. To that end, we incorporated several
crucial features of existing firms in a virtual organization. We allowed subjects to allocate their
time between a real-effort task that created value for the organization and a real-leisure activity.
We considered the most decentralized form of organizations in which no hierarchies existed and
all subjects had the same role. This represented a natural starting point that guided us in our quest
to identify the elements that lead to organizational success.
As a first step, we compared organizations using team and individual incentives in order to
assess the relevance of incentives effects in our virtual organizations. We found that individual
incentives led to levels of production that were 52% higher and levels of Internet usage that were
46% lower than under team incentives. These findings confirmed that implementing highpowered incentives schemes is an important factor of organizational success consistently with
theoretical research (Holmström (1979), see Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review).
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Nevertheless, most organizations are limited in their use of individual incentives as a result of
asymmetric information (Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Holmström (1982)) and may have to
resort to alternative mechanisms to achieve high production levels.
We studied peer monitoring as an example of mechanism that may allow organizations to
recover the efficiency loss provoked by the use of team incentives. We found that using peer
monitoring in combination with team incentives allowed organizations to reach production levels
that were as high as in the case of individual incentives. The use of peer monitoring reduced
shirking behaviors. In particular, Internet usage was 54% lower for organizations relying on peer
monitoring compared with those using team incentives alone. In contrast to public good games
with punishments, both effort and efficiency were increased by the use of peer monitoring. To our
knowledge, ours is the first controlled experiment showing that peer monitoring can offset the
loss in efficiency resulting from the use of low-powered incentives schemes. Peer monitoring was
particularly effective because subjects spent a limited amount of time watching others (4.4% of
their time) while sharing the monitoring burden so that all subjects were being watched at least
once during the experiment. It is as if people possessed natural skills for peer monitoring and
understood both its positive effect on productivity as well as the negative consequences of its
intensive use. However, the positive impact of peer pressure on productivity did not apply to low
performers even though peer pressure pushed them to work harder and reduce their Internet
usage. The increase in effort did not translate into an increase in productivity as low performers
became less accurate as a result of peer monitoring.
In summary, peer-pressure was a very effective mechanism by which organizations using team
incentives achieved production levels that were remarkably close to those of organizations relying
on individual incentives schemes. This is good news for most organizations that cannot rely on
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precise measures of individual contributions. Peer monitoring is traditionally seen as a decisive
advantage of organizations with respect to markets as its effectiveness usually relies on face to
face and repeated interactions among parties that are inherent to the organizational environment
(Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005), Falk and Ichino (2006), Mas and Moretti (2009)).
However, the implementation of virtual monitoring devices of the type used in the present paper
may mitigate this comparative advantage of organizations as it may raise the effectiveness of peer
monitoring in the completion of market transactions.
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6. APPENDIX

FIGURE A.1.—Average production by range of Internet usage.
TABLE A.1
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION
PER PERIOD (TEAM INCENTIVES TREATMENT)

Intercept
Trend
Period 2
Period 3
Period 4
Period 5
Number of observations
and Log likelihood

Coefficients (P-values)

Coefficients (P-values)

1.101** (0.02)
1.003** (0.03)
0.924** (0.04)
1.211*** (0.00)
1.592*** (0.00)
n = 300
Left censored 101 obs
-557.425, Prob > χ² = 0.000

1.044** (0.03)
0.336*** (0.00)
n = 300
Left censored 101 obs
-711.102, Prob > χ² = 0.000
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TABLE A.2
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION PER
PERIOD
Treatment (T)
Treatment (I)
Coefficients (P-values)
Coefficients (P-values)
Intercept
-0.983 (0.37)
2.507** (0.02)
Trend
0.147 (0.37)
0.335** (0.02)
Group production in (t-1)
0.597* (0.10)
-0.006 (0.98)
Group production in (t-1)
-0.908** (0.03)
-0.030 (0.93)
× Dummy greater than group average in
(t-1)93
Dummy greater than group average in (t4.675*** (0.00)
0.805 (0.55)
1)
n = 300
n = 300
Number of observations
Left censored 76 obs
Left censored 76 obs
and Log likelihood
-451.414, Prob > χ² =
-568.747, Prob > χ² =
0.000
0.000
TABLE A.3
P-VALUES FOR CLUSTERED T-TESTS (CLUSTERED
WILCOXON RANK-SUM TESTS) ASSESSING DIFFERENCES
IN PERIOD PRODUCTION BETWEEN THE TEAM
INCENTIVES AND THE INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES
TREATMENT
Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

Period 4

Period 5

0.025**
(0.029**)

0.026**
(0.027**)

0.025**
(0.043**)

0.006***
(0.025**)

0.004***
(0.020**)

We identify the top three performers as high ranks and the bottom three performers as low
ranks. Subjects that do not belong to either one of these two categories are grouped together and
referred to as middle ranks (rank 4, 5, 6 and 7). In the table below, we show that the percentage
of high-ability subjects increases with rank category.

93

This dummy variable takes a value of one if a given subject produces strictly more than the average of the other
group members in a given period.
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TABLE A.4
ABILITY FACTOR BY SUBJECTS’
PERFORMANCE RANKS FOR ALL TREATMENTS
Ranks

% subjects with high
ability factor

High

72.7%

Middle

50.0%

Low

23.6%

TABLE A.5
CLICKING TASK PERFORMANCE AND TIMING ACROSS TREATMENTS
Clicking task

Treatment (I)

Treatment (T)

Treatment (TP)

98%

97%

99%

Treatment I

Treatment T

Treatment TP

vs. Treatment T

vs. Treatment TP

vs. Treatment I

p = 0.616 (0.397)

p = 0.784 (0.223)

p = 0.475 (0.465)

Success rate
(Average proportion of the 240
yellow boxes subjects had clicked
before they disappear from the
screen)

P-value clustered Wilcoxon ranksum test (clustered t-test)
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TABLE A.6
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INTERNET USAGE PER
PERIOD
Treatment T
Coefficients (P-values)

Treatment T
Coefficients (P-values)

Intercept

0.368 (0.65)

0.730 (0.35)

Trend

1.196*** (0.00)

-

Period 2

-

2.463*** (0.00)

Period 3
Period 4
Period 5

n = 300
Right censored 23 obs
-933.539, Prob > χ² = 0.000

4.125*** (0.00)
4.799*** (0.00)
4.786*** (0.00)
n = 300
Right censored 23 obs
-930.221, Prob > χ² = 0.000

Number of observations
and Log likelihood

TABLE A.7
P-VALUES FOR STATISTICAL TESTS ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN
INTERNET USAGE BETWEEN THE TEAM INCENTIVES AND THE
INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES TREATMENTS
Wilcoxon
Clustered
Wilcoxon
t-test
rank-sum
Clustered Wilcoxon
t-test
rank-sum
(group
test
t-test
rank-sum
test
averages)
(group
test94
averages)
0.0007*** 0.0075*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0123**
0.0221**

94

This was performed using Datta and Satten test (2005).
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TABLE A.8
P-VALUES FOR CLUSTERED T-TESTS (CLUSTERED
WILCOXON RANK-SUM TESTS) ASSESSING
DIFFERENCES IN INTERNET USAGE PER PERIOD
BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND TEAM INCENTIVES
TREATMENTS
Period 1
0.003***
(0.021**)

Period 2

Period 3

Period 4

Period 5

0.002*** 0.023** 0.006*** 0.000***
(0.019**) (0.05**) (0.013**) (0.002***)

We run the following regressions so as to assess the impact of subjects’ previous performance
on watching others and being watched by others. We use Tobit regressions with random effects.
We also use dummy variables for each time frame of five minutes so as to control for different
levels of production within a given period. The dependent variables correspond either to the
amount of time (in seconds) a subject was watching others in a given time span of five minutes or
the amount of time (in seconds) a subject had been watched by others in the same time span.

TABLE A.9
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WATCHING ACTIVITIES AS A
FUNCTION OF PAST PRODUCTION

Intercept
Trend (periods)
Individual production in t-1
Minute 6 to 10
Minute 11 to 15
Minute 16 to 20
Number of observations
and Log likelihood

Dependent variable:
Time watching in t
Coefficients (P-values)
-76.437*** (0.00)
0.358 (0.85)
-0.091 (0.18)
19.429** (0.02)
20.531** (0.01)
73.602*** (0.00)
n = 1140
Left censored 808
(3 right censored)
-2184.538, Prob > χ² = 0.000
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Dependent variable:
Time being watched in t
Coefficients (P-values)
-2.590 (0.70)
5.401*** (0.00)
0.016 (0.71)
37.638*** (0.00)
43.134*** (0.00)
117.485*** (0.00)
n = 1140
Left censored 159
(27 right censored)
-5514.017, Prob > χ² = 0.000

TABLE A.10
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION
PER PERIOD IN THE PEER PRESSURE TREATMENT
Regression 1
Coefficients (P-values)

Regression 2
Coefficients (P-values)

Intercept
Trend
Period 2
Period 3
Period 4
Period 5

2.826*** (0.00)
0.675 (0.12)
0.720* (0.09)
1.433*** (0.00)
1.405*** (0.00)

2.609*** (0.00)
0.356*** (0.00)
-

Number of observations
and Log likelihood

n = 300
Left censored 70 obs
-617.9817, Prob > χ² = 0.0038

n = 300
Left censored 70 obs
-618.798, Prob > χ² = 0.0038

TABLE A.11
P-VALUES FOR STATISTICAL TESTS ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN INDIVIDUAL
PRODUCTION ACROSS TREATMENTS
Wilcoxon
Clustered
Wilcoxon
t-test
rank-sum
Clustered Wilcoxon
t-test
rank-sum
(group
test
t-test
rank-sum
test
averages)
(group
test95
averages)
Peer pressure
vs.
0.0190** 0.0519** 0.0079*** 0.0157** 0.0471** 0.0411**
Team
incentives
Peer pressure
vs.
0.8728
0.7310
0.8660
0.7654
0.8403
0.6282
Individual
incentives

95

This was performed using Datta and Satten test (2005). The previous authors as well as Galbraith, Daniel and
Vissel (2010) provided us with R codes for the test.
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TABLE A.12
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION
PER PERIOD (after the completion of the first table) AS A FUNCTION OF ABILITY
AND TREATMENT DUMMY THAT TAKES VALUE ONE FOR TREATMENT TP
Treatments TP and T
Coefficients (P-values)

Treatments TP and I
Coefficients (P-values)

Intercept

4.301*** (0.00)

5.413 (0.00)

Ability Factor

3.484*** (0.00)

2.489*** (0.00)

Treatment TP

1.124*** (0.01)

-0.375 (0.44)

Number of observations
and Log likelihood

n = 120
Left censored 22 obs
-246.514, Prob > χ² = 0.00

n = 126
Left censored 17 obs
-282.771, Prob > χ² = 0.00

TABLE A.13
P-VALUES FOR CLUSTERED T-TESTS (CLUSTERED WILCOXON
RANK-SUM TESTS) ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN INDIVIDUAL
PRODUCTION PER PERIOD ACROSS TREATMENTS
Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

Period 4

Period 5

Treatment T vs.
Tretmant TP

0.012**
(0.027**)

0.061*
(0.124)

0.060*
(0.094*)

0.039**
(0.095*)

0.035**
(0.041**)

Treatment I vs.
Tretmant TP

0.755
(0.778)

0.900
(0.639)

0.757
(0.819)

0.959
(0.932)

0.581
(0.537)
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TABLE A.14
P-VALUES FOR STATISTICAL TESTS ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN INTERNET
USAGE ACROSS TREATMENTS
Wilcoxon
Clustered
rank-sum
Wilcoxon
t-test
Clustered Wilcoxon
test
t-test
rank-sum
(group
t-test
rank-sum
(group
test
averages)
test
averages)
Peer pressure
vs.
0.0029*** 0.0096*** 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0191** 0.0411**
Team
incentives
Peer pressure
vs.
0.7276
0.7543
0.7253
0.8280
0.6782
0.5338
Individual
incentives
TABLE A.15
P-VALUES FOR CLUSTERED T-TESTS (CLUSTERED WILCOXON RANK-SUM TESTS)
ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN INTERNET USAGE PER PERIOD ACROSS
TREATMENTS
Period 1
Period 2
Period 3
Period 4
Period 5
Treatment T vs.
0.033**
0.011**
0.044**
0.008***
0.007**
Tretmant TP
(0.128)
(0.032**)
(0.083*)
(0.021**)
(0.001***)
Treatment I vs.
0.283
0.438
0.874
0.963
0.841
Tretmant TP
(0.187)
(0.785)
(0.490)
(0.747)
(0.265)

TABLE A.16
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INTERNET USAGE PER
PERIOD IN THE PEER PRESSURE TREATMENT
Regression 1
Regression 2
Coefficients (P-values)
Coefficients (P-values)
Intercept

1.191* (0.06)

0.657 (0.290)

Trend
Period 2
Period 3
Period 4
Period 5

0.722 (0.17)
2.188*** (0.00)
2.245*** (0.00)
2.019*** (0.00)

0.563*** (0.00)
-

Number of observations
and Log likelihood

n = 300
Right censored 2 obs
-813.4216, Prob > χ² = 0.000

n = 300
Right censored 2 obs
-818.706, Prob > χ² = 0.000
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TABLE A.17
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR
INTERNET USAGE PER PERIOD IN THE TEAM
INCENTIVES AND THE PEER PRESSURE
TREATMENTS
Coefficients (P-values)
Intercept

0.533 (0.438)

Trend
Trend×Treatment
Treatment
(Takes value one if peer
pressure and zero if team
incentives)

1.176*** (0.00)
-0.153*** (0.00)

Number of observations
and Log likelihood

0.011 (0.97)
n = 600
Right censored 25 obs
-1783.255, Prob > χ² = 0.000

TABLE A.18
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION
ACROSS RANK CATEGORIES IN A 5-MINUTE TIME SPAN
Low-rank subjects
Middle- and high- rank subjects
Coefficients (P-values)
Coefficients (P-values)
Intercept
-0.2507 (0.19)
0.5888*** (0.01)
Being watched in t-1
-0.0022*** (0.00)
0.0009 (0.22)
Being watched in t-2
Watching in t-1
Watching in t-2
Ability factor
Trend (Period)

0.0007 (0.42)
0.0002 (0.88)
-0.0014 (0.36)
0.3800* (0.10)
0.0643* (0.09)

0.0020*** (0.00)
0.0005 (0.78)
0.0009 (0.61)
0.4444* (0.05)
0.077** (0.02)

Number of observations
and Log likelihood

N = 324
112 left censored obs
-146.826, Prob > χ² = 0.035

n = 756
100 left censored obs
-930.929, Prob > χ² = 0.001
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